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Preface 
 
 This is one in a series of short books reflecting on issues which 
have interested me through my adult life. At school I did not think 
explicitly about power, though I was of course subjected to power 
and increasingly exercised it in various ways. At University I learnt 
mostly political history, but found it rather dull as I had never 
experienced much of what I was reading about. I did, however, 
greatly enjoy the paper on political philosophy – Aristotle, Hobbes, 
Rousseau and Marx.  
 It was really only when I began to study anthropology, and 
particularly when I began to be involved in political decision 
making as a member of boards and committees and running 
organizations as a teacher at Cambridge University that I began to 
appreciate the subject. I did not teach much in the field of political 
anthropology, but was concerned with legal anthropology and the 
history of violence, building on earlier work on the history of 
witchcraft.  
 In the 1990’s I made a study of a number of great theorists who 
had worked on power, from Montesquieu and Tocqueville through 
to Fukuzawa and Maitland.  I also travelled more widely beyond 
Nepal, to Japan and later to China, and experienced different kinds 
of political system in action.  
 My reflections on power were crystallized when I decided in 
2003 to try to explain what I had learnt in my forty years as an 
historian and anthropologist to my grand-daughter. I wrote a 
number of letters to Lily, imagined to be about 18 years old, 
explaining what I thought on such questions as Violence, War, 
Democracy and Justice. These letters were published in 2005 as 
Letters to Lily. Recently I decided to read them out and film them 
and these readings are included below.  
In the year Lily was published, I was asked to give a set of four 
lectures for first-year students at Cambridge University who were 
starting either on the social and political science or archaeology and 
anthropology degree. This was my first attempt to lecture directly 
on power and I decided to use the occasion to  
to reflect and summarize what I had learnt over a period of 
teaching and researching on issues of power and its uses.  
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I assumed that my audience could be interested but that most of 
them, like me when I was eighteen, might not have considered 
these issues very explicitly in their previous schooling. So I tried to 
keep the level suitable for very bright, but as yet untaught, young 
people.  
The lectures covered four main areas or themes. Here is the 
rough plan when I set out to write them over Christmas 2005.  
 
A first rough plan for four part 1 political anthropology 
lectures   15/12/05 
 
Lecture 1: a map of the territory: some tools for the job 
What is politics, what is power? Politics and politics. 
The general theories of political theorists: key concepts from 
Aristotle to Foucault, by way of anthropologists  
Some key terms and ideas explained further 
The four major systems: uncentralized – bands and tribes, 
centralized, states and chiefdoms and how they work roughly. 
The reasons for transition to the State.  
Major state systems in the world – aristocracy, democracy, 
communism etc.  
 
Lecture 2: nations and violence 
The nature of the nation and theories of nationalism 
How the nation imagines itself – symbolism and ideology 
Warfare and violence: feuding and war 
 
Lecture 3: law and order – types of legal system in the world 
Legal settlements in societies without a State 
Inquisitorial and confrontational legal systems 
Judges, juries, rule of law etc. etc.  
 
Lecture 4: the State and the individual – threats and counter-
threats 
The rings of threat:  
(war), bandits, mafia, heretics/terrorists, civil society 
 
* 
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 The lectures were filmed by Zilan Wang and have been 
roughly edited by myself. They were given as part of a series of 
eight lectures (the other four were on economic anthropology).  
 
 I received back 101 questionnaires after the lectures, ranking 
the lectures in terms of Interest and Presentation on a four-point 
scale. Here is my brief summary of the comments sent to the 
Department.   
 
“This was the first year of doing the 4 on politics (as well as 4 on 
economics last year). I think it went well and I certainly enjoyed 
giving them. The numerical ratings were:  
Interest: Excellent (4) – 81; Good (3) – 18; Reasonable (2) – 2 
Presentation: Excellent (4) – 91; Good (3) – 10 
The students, as ever, particularly liked the level, the plan on the 
board, a short rest after 40 minutes. It was my first full use of a 
website behind the lectures and both from the very enthusiastic 
comments and the hundreds of ‘hits’ this seems to have been a 
good resources. The superlatives were perhaps higher than I have 
ever had. I look forward to next year! No real complaints repeated 
by more than one student, except two who said it was too fast, and 
one who said it was too slow.” 
 
* 
 
It should be noted that the lecture notes are rough and 
unchecked. There are allusions to authors which are not fully 
documented. Thanks to the Internet it should be possible to follow 
up the references. For those who want to see the edition of the 
book I took the materials from, there is a catalogue of my library 
at:  
 
http://www.alanmacfarlane.com/FILES/library.htm 
 
 
The basic readings I suggested to go with the lectures will 
become dated. But they may still be a useful start for those 
wanting to follow up some of the ideas in the lectures.  
 
* 
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Because I was lecturing in a new lecture room which had 
internet connections, I experimented with the idea of 
incorporating films and other materials into the lectures. I always 
allowed a five minute break in my lectures, and used this to show 
materials from my website,  
www.alanmacfarlane.com  
 
To give an idea of this experiment, and a few examples of 
other people talking about power and violence, and a few of the 
technologies of war, I have included at the end a few films which 
were taken as part of six part television documentary series 
broadcast in 2000. This was filmed in 1999 as background to the 
Millenium series ‘The Day the World Took Off’, made for 
Channel 4 by Windfall Films. I was an advisor and presenter in 
the series. The films are included with the kind permission of 
David Dugan, the Chairman of Windfall Films, and of Simon 
Schaffer and Christopher Cullen, who appear in the films.  
 
* 
 
Two final points. The lectures and book for Lily were written 
within a couple of years of each other. So there is some overlap, 
and I used some parts of the book in my lectures, as will be seen.  
 
Secondly, the letters were written at a time when the Iraq and 
Afghanistan invasion had fairly recently happened and the 
rhetoric about the ‘war on terror’ was at its most high-pitched and 
contentious. This context, and other contemporary references in 
the lectures to the world which the students were experiencing in 
2005/6 should be remembered. Ten years is a long time in the 
history of the world, and if I were giving the lectures now I would 
clearly not say all of the same things.  
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PART ONE 
 
 
 
 
SOME LETTERS TO LILY 
 
 
The original letters are contained in my book Letters to Lily; On 
How the World Works (Profile, 2005). Here I have added the 
questions which I put to myself in writing the letters, as I thought 
I might have asked when I was aged about eighteen, put into the 
voice of my grand-daughter Lily.  My answer is in the filmed 
reading of the letter. 
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Is violence necessary? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://downloads.sms.cam.ac.uk/1377536/1377541.m4v 
 
       We’re constantly being told to be loving, to turn the other 
cheek, that humans are kindly. Yet you just have to turn on the 
television or open a paper and the catalogue of wife beatings, 
child abuse, rapes, murders, cruelty to animals and all sorts of 
acts of violence seem endless. Why are we so very violent? 
 
       And come to that, what is violence? If I kick my sister that 
is ‘violence’, but if I push her in certain games we don’t think of 
it as violence. Is violence just physical? When the mafia threaten 
people, is that violence? If a man comes home drunk and curses 
his wife, is that violence? Can we, as I’ve heard, even call certain 
kinds of music, architecture or even speech – for instance what 
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happened at Hitler’s rallies with all those dreadful marches and 
songs and flags, - a form of violence? 
 
      From your experience of what you tell me was once a very 
peaceful society in Nepal, but is now filled with fighting, as well 
as all your other travels and reading, could you explain some of 
the patterns behind much of what seems random and pointless? 
Then I could perhaps face it all better.  
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What is war and why do we fight? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://downloads.sms.cam.ac.uk/1377553/1377558.m4v 
 
 
The world seems awash with wars. Not world wars, perhaps, 
but nasty little brutish wars where people are maimed and 
killed, precious resources destroyed, hatreds sown. Why do we, as 
a species, fight so much? I do wish I could see the patterns which 
lie behind a history of blood and vengeance which stretches back 
in my history books to the earliest Empires and before.  
 
      Much of the most awful bloodshed seems to come out of 
something which I feel is different from regular wars. It seems 
nearer to what I’ve heard called ‘feuding’, such as what is 
happening in Israel and Palestine, Kashmir, Sri Lanka, many 
parts of Africa. Are these really feuds and, if so, what is a feud? 
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    It’s obvious that there are many kinds of war – conquest, 
booty, revenge, fear, greed, all sorts of motives seem to be there. 
Some warfare seems to be like a game, with rules and prizes just 
like a violent sport. Other wars seem to be about religion and 
spiritual things, whether seizing the magical power of others 
(head-hunting) or spreading one’s beliefs (crusades).  
 
       It seems to me that you might be able to help me make sense 
of some of this awful activity if you could stand back and give 
me a wide (war in lots of types of society) and deep (war 
patterns over thousands of years) account. Then perhaps the 
next time my country asks for my support in war, or war panics 
are spreading, I’ll be better able to decide what to think and do. 
Please help me to understand the horrors of war. 
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Who are the terrorists? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://downloads.sms.cam.ac.uk/1377587/1377592.m4v 
 
     Who are the terrorists? I mean, if a terrorist is someone who 
makes people feel extreme fear or terror, surely a person or 
government which unnecessarily whips up extreme fear can just 
as fairly be called ‘terrorist’, or at least ‘terrorizing’, as those 
who are opposed to the government and let off bombs? 
 
     Also, it seems to me that terrorism is very much in the eyes 
of the beholder. When the early Zionists in Israel bombed the 
British they were called terrorists – until they came to power 
and became heroes. Likewise with the leaders of the African 
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National Congress, most notably Nelson Mandela. Overnight 
his release turned him from terrorist to freedom fighter. I’ve 
heard of numerous examples.  
 
      So I’d like you to explain what terrorism is and why, as far 
as I know, we are engaged for the first time in history in a ‘war 
on terrorism’. 
 
     Or is it the first time? Were there such wars in the twentieth 
century? Are there similarities between this war and the earlier 
wars of ‘civilized peoples’ against heretics, Jews, witches, 
communists and others? How do such moral panics, if that is 
what they are, work? 
 
      Could you also explain the ways in which changing the laws 
influences what we find and what other effects spreading a 
terror of terrorism has. Surely there must be various different 
ways of reacting to those whom we judge to be threatening our 
way of life? 
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How well  does Democracy work? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://downloads.sms.cam.ac.uk/1377703/1377708.m4v 
 
     You often remind me that when I first came across the word 
‘Democracy’ I pronounced it ‘Demo-Crazy’. Maybe I was right! 
It does still seem to me a little crazy. But I’ll be voting soon and 
I’d really appreciate it if you could explain simply what it is 
about.  
 
     What does the word mean? Why is democracy (according to 
some people) so important? Where did democracy come from? 
 
     Perhaps you could explain how it is that a system which 
hands over power for four or more years to a bunch of people 
who often seem to forget why we voted for them or listen to what 
we say is so great? I heard someone joke that it is the worst of all 
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possible systems – except for the rest, which are even worse. Is 
that all that can be said for it? Is it a bit like the cautionary 
tale you used to read to me about the boy eaten by a lion in the 
zoo: 
 
‘But always keep a hold of nurse,  
For fear of finding something worse’ 
 
     There are lots of things I’d like to know. What is meant by 
the ‘tyranny of the majority’? What happens when democracies 
are threatened.?  What makes them collapse? Can democracy 
last? Why has England been so important in the development of  
democracy?  
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Where does freedom come from? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://downloads.sms.cam.ac.uk/1377728/1377733.m4v 
 
     Where does freedom come from? Indeed, what is freedom? Is 
it the same as liberty? Is it a universal human right, or just an 
accident that occurs by chance in certain societies? Should we 
force people to be free, even if they don’t wish to be? And will free 
individuals and free societies continue long into the future? 
 
      There are so many questions here which I’ve never really 
thought about, but now start to intrigue me. Perhaps it is partly 
because a whole heap of large civilizations which were closed 
before are trying to make a go of freedom, the former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe, China and a number of 
dictatorships. They look to our traditions. But when they ask us 
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to explain what our freedom means, what it is upheld by, where 
it came from, then I am really not able to say much.  
 
      I’m also interested because I’m just reaching the age of 
freedom – from my parents and from school. I’ll soon be able to 
vote and make certain legal contracts. What do these freedoms 
mean?  
 
      It seems that freedom give us the right to do things, but does 
it also bring responsibilities? And is freedom only possible if 
there are also rules and constraints? 
 
     People often tell me that freedom of speech, of rights to join 
with others, are very important and somehow linked to 
something people talk a lot about nowadays called ‘civil society’. 
What is this? And how did it emerge and is it really important? 
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What is bureaucracy for? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://downloads.sms.cam.ac.uk/1377753/1377758.m4v 
 
      I find it odd how much time I seem to spend taking exams, 
filling in forms and going to meetings. Why do I have to do all 
this? And why are there so many people around just organizing 
other people to do things? Surely we don’t need all these petty 
rules and regulations interfering in our lives, do we? What is 
this all about? 
 
     Anyway, it’s an odd word ‘bureaucracy’. Where does it come 
from? 
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     Why does the amount of paperwork and clip-board people 
seem constantly to expand? And in the face of this rising tide 
what can I do to preserve my time and freedom? 
 
     Why am I constantly being asked to account for everything, 
to ‘audit’ my life, to make everything transparent so that people 
can check on everything, inspect everything as if they didn’t  
trust me? Why are there constant exams and tests? And why are 
there so many people warning us of risks and trying to stop us 
doing anything adventurous? 
 
      Could you explain this as I seem to be growing up in a world 
where we are in danger of drowning in rules and meetings. 
Could you show me what parts of bureaucracy are necessary 
and useful, which are like a spreading disease.  
 
      This might help me to keep some freedom amidst the red 
tape. I might avoid the prying eyes of suspicious and officious 
people constantly dedicated to close me in an ‘iron cage’ (a nice 
phrase I heard on the radio – someone called Weber said it I 
think).  
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How do we get just ice? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://downloads.sms.cam.ac.uk/1377778/1377783.m4v 
 
      How can we find a way to settle our disputes fairly? Is there 
a difference between law and justice? Is justice and the judicial 
process the same everywhere in the world? Where did our well 
known system of English Law come from? 
 
   You may be surprised that I’m asking you these rather 
abstract questions, but I’ve begun to realize two things. The first 
is how very important our legal system is for our sense of 
security and freedom. The second is that I am abysmally 
ignorant about the basic principles of how our system works. 
When visitors from other countries ask me what the ‘rule of law’ 
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means, or why juries are so important, or whether the English 
have ever included torture in their legal procedures, I haven’t a 
clue.  
 
     Surely the way we face the constant conflicts in our society – 
between people, between people and governments, about ideas and 
ideologies – should be really interesting? After all, detective 
stories and even legal series on TV can be really gripping. So it 
should be possible for you to explain my legal world and how it 
differs from those in other societies in a way which is both 
comprehensible and not dull.  
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PART TWO  
 
 
FOUR LECTURES ON POWER 
 
 
A sociological and historical overview given in a series of 
lectures to first year students at Cambridge University in 
January 2006. 
 
 
Preliminary readings 
 
Christopher Hann, Social Anthropology (1998) , chaps. 10-14 
David Nugent and Joan Vincent (eds.), A Companion to the 
Anthropology of Politics (2004) 
John Gledhill, Anthropological Perspectives on Politics (1994) 
Simon Roberts, Order and Dispute (1979) 
 
For specific topics it is almost always worth starting with The 
Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (1968). Also there are some useful 
articles  in Tim Ingold (ed), The Companion Encyclopaedia of 
Anthropology (1994).  
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1 (a) Theories of power  
       (b) the State 
 
A broad view of political systems in all of human history; the state 
and systems of law; a genealogy of political theory from Aristotle 
onwards; the anthropological contribution to the understanding of 
politics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://downloads.sms.cam.ac.uk/1411628/1411633.m4v 
 
Readings 
 
Hann, C., Social Anthropology (2000), chapters 10-11 
E.E.Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer (1965) 
Edmund Leach, Political Systems of Highland Burma (1954) 
F.G.Bailey, Stratagems and Spoils (1969) 
Abner Cohen, Two Dimensional Man (1974) 
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NOTES ON WHICH THE LECTURE WAS BASED 
 
AN OVERVIEW 
 
Overview – welcome to the lectures and explain their purpose and 
structure.  
A sad and bloody tale, full of pain and confusion.  
 
The first lecture will give the broad picture; what politics is; some 
key terms and ideas; an overview of the major theories of political 
forms and life up to anthropology; the anthropological approaches 
to politics; the present 
The second lecture will look at nationalism and violence – feud 
and war 
The third lecture will look at law and dispute settlement 
The fourth lecture will look at the tension between the State and 
its citizens, in four forms – bandits, mafia, heretics/terrorists, civil 
society 
 
A first mega-plan or trailer of the plot 
 
See ‘Preindustrial Political Systems’ – classificatory scheme 
based on several authors.  
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Preindustrial Political Systems: Centralized   -  Uncentralized  
Centralized: divided into States (stratified), Chiefdoms (ranks) 
Uncentralized: divided into tribes  and bands 
Tribes:  divided into ‘Big Man’ systems, associational, 
segmentary lineages, ritually stratified, village councils 
Bands: divided into – composite, patrilocal, family 
 
 
Let us take the broad view. Homo sapiens sapiens has been 
around for well over 100,000 years. For over 90% of that time 
(until about 10,000 years ago) there was no such thing as 
‘Politics’. That is to say, there was plenty of power exercised, but 
it was mingled up with kinship, ritual, economic life.  
 
If you had said to someone in a HG band or tribal society, ‘take 
me to your leader’, they would have looked puzzled, in the same 
way as a member of Cambridge Univ. is puzzled when a tourist 
asks him or her to ‘take me to the University’ or the centre of the 
university.  
 
Power is diffused, these are known as acephalous societies: 
Acephalous society: Literally a “headless” society. Refers to a 
highly decentralized and relatively egalitarian form of political 
organizations. 
 
Politics in the western sense is absent in HG and tribal society – 
there is no instituted process. How to conceptualize ‘politics’ in 
such societies, which have dominated most of history until 
recently has been one of the central tasks of modern 
anthropology.  
 
The first great revolution was when ‘heads’ appeared. There were 
two major forms, chiefs and chiefdoms, states and civilizations. 
 
State: (1) A political entity that exercises sovereign rights over a 
territory and exercises power through centralized, hierarchical 
political institutions of control, revenue extraction, and 
enforcement of law and civic duty. (2) A political unit with 
centralized decision-making affecting a large population. Most 
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states have cities with public buildings; full-time craft and 
religious specialists; and “official” art style; a hierarchical social 
structure topped by an elite class; and a governmental monopoly 
on the legitimate use of force to implement policies. 
 
 This occurred perhaps ten thousand years ago and gives rise to 
the great civilizations of China, India, the Middle East, South 
America and the chiefly states of Africa and elsewhere. This is 
the difference between centralized and de-centralized.  This is the 
first great revolution, equivalent to economics as an instituted 
process or the setting up of  religious systems with priests and 
writing.  
 
Later examples of such a world more familiar to many of us are 
the classical civilizations of Greece and Rome in the west. 
 
The second great revolution is the further separation out of 
polities, what we might describe as the rise of the modern 
political world. This was, in E.P.Thompson’s metaphor, a long 
arch from about the C12-C18, consolidated and made widely 
apparent in the French and American Revolutions.  
 
 This consists of demarcating out politics still further. Previously 
politics was still embedded to a certain extent in religion and to a 
certain extent in economics and kinship. Now there is a separation 
of politics from religion above all, where it had remained 
embedded and from economics.  
So the second revolution completes the first. 
 
The first great change had sliced the apple in half, leaving it in 
two bits politics-religion, society-economy (as in part IIA and 
peasant societies). The second sliced each of these two parts into 
two, leaving us with modernity – politics, society, religion, 
economics as instituted and theoretically separated spheres. So in 
many ways world history is reflected in our Tripos. Year one is 
tribalism and HG, part IIA is peasantries and partial slicing. Part 
IIB is modernity and full slicing. [In a Ph.D. you bring them all 
together in the post-modern world which merges all the 
distinctions!] 
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Law 
 
The same approach could be made towards law. The normal 
process is again a double revolution. Hunter Gatherers and tribal 
groups have plenty of laws, but no Law. If you asked ‘take me to 
your court or judge’ or even asked what the laws were, there 
would be blank looks. So the first move is from embedded law, 
where there are many laws (a.k.a. customs, traditional ways of 
doing things) but no Law, to Law as an instituted process. This 
occurs at the same time as the disembedding of politics – and 
possibly for similar reasons (literacy, new technologies, 
population density etc.). A world without Law has been again an 
intriguing problem for legal anthropologists.  
 
This is the world again, with modifications by the Romans etc., 
until the middle ages. Then again there is a long arch up to the 
eighteenth century, when two major legal systems vie for 
supremacy. One is a continuation of the older system – the 
Roman law tradition based on birth-status, with different laws 
depending on rank, gender etc. The second is Anglo-American 
law which is based on the premise of contract, of largely equal 
citizens within a modern contractual state. This is the famous shift 
I shall describe later, formulated by Sir Henry Maine, from status 
to contract. We now not only have Law, but Law totally 
disembedded, even from politics (in theory).  
 
Now all of this may sound like a very evolutionary story, and to a 
certain extent it is. But there is neither teleology (it had to be like 
this, tending in a direction), nor do all civilizations necessarily 
follow this route.  
 
By the end of the nineteenth century, many westerners thought 
that we had reached ‘the end of history’, that all major political 
forms had been mapped and understood, and that the best 
(‘democracy’) had been found, the survival of the fittest. Now in 
the twenty-first century we realize that much more was in store – 
not just the discovery of societies without politics and law by 
anthropologists; not just new forms to make politics totally 
dominant by making the State all powerful (fascism) or 
supposedly abolishing it and making it even more powerful 
 29 
(communism). There were also increasingly successful nations 
which tried out systems of law and politics which were hybrids 
and new innovations – as is happening in China, India and much 
of the world today. 
 
So there are many surprises in store. I have come across just such 
a surprise. Using my western sociological framework of 
separations, I have recently been examining the history and 
structure of Japan. I am increasingly realizing that while having 
the semblance of these modernities and separations, in fact below 
the surface (or behind the mirror) has not disembedded politics, 
nor law, so that, strangely it could be argued that it has no State 
(take me to your leader will get you nowhere in Japan) and no 
Legal system (there are courts, but people avoid them like the 
plague).  
 
Conceptual schemata to establish and make explicit the major 
changes 
 
But let us start with a genealogy of political theory to anchor us in 
something.  
 
The first great separation, about ten thousand years ago, was  the 
institutionalization of politics as a separate sphere, as ‘Politics’.  
 
The most famous formulation of this great shift is in Aristotle’s 
brilliant  is the first brilliant overview of Politics as an instituted 
process – the different forms of government which could be 
envisaged when there are political institutions, although they are 
still largely status-based (non-slave etc., cities etc). He 
distinguished Politics from other spheres of action – what 
happened in the Polis (city) among those who had power. He 
made the famous distinctions between forms of government: 
aristocracy, plutocracy, oligarchy, democracy.  
 
Aristotle on the aims and primacy of politics: (Written c. middle 
of C4 B.C.) 
  
Aristotle, Politics, p.28 ‘Hence it is evident that the state is a 
creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. 
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And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, 
is either above humanity, or below it… Now the reason why man 
is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious 
animals is evident…. Man is the only animal whom she has 
endowed with the gift of speech.’ 
 
‘Thus the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the 
individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part… For 
man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated 
from law and justice, he is the worst of all…’ 
 
From the analysis, The Classification of Constitutions: 
p.12 ‘The aims of the state are two; to satisfy man’s social 
instinct, and to fit him for the good life. Political rule differs from 
that over slaves in aiming primarily at the good of those who are 
ruled. Constitutions are bad or good according as the common 
welfare is, or is not, their aim. Of good Constitutions there are 
three: Monarchy, Aristocracy [the best people are the rulers], and 
Polity [half way between oligarchy and democracy]. Of bad there 
are also three: Tyranny Oligarchy, Extreme Democracy. The bad 
are perversions of the good….  
 
‘Democracy is the rule of the poor; oligarchy is that of the rich. 
Democrats take Equality for their motto; oligarchs believe that 
political rights should be unequal and proportionate to wealth. But 
both sides miss the true object of the state, which is virtue.’ 
….(p.14) ‘Of  Democracies there are four kinds. The worst, 
extreme Democracy, is that in which all offices are open to all, 
and the will of the people overrides all law.’  
 
The book describes revolutions, how states should be arranged 
etc. etc. the ideal state etc. Fascinating.  
 
This formulation largely held for nearly two thousand years, 
though there were, of course, major Christian and Islamic scholars 
who amended and glossed it.  
 
The second great separation is the separation out of Politics from 
religion, society and economics. This took almost half a 
millenium, but there are several high points.  
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Then Machiavelli (The Prince, 1513) is among the first to think 
of a non-religious analysis, dividing off systems etc. Another 
landmark: 
 
An assumption of the base nature of humans: ‘If men were 
entirely good this precept would not hold, but because they are 
bad, and will not keep faith with you, you too are not bound to 
observe it with them’ (Prince, 142) Hence the world of pre-
emptive strike and power politics etc… 
 
Separation of politics and ethics: ‘…for if everything is 
considered carefully, it will be found that something which looks 
like virtue, if followed, would be his ruin; whilst something else, 
which looks like vice, yet followed brings him security and 
prosperity’ (Prince, 123) 
 
The choice of evils: ‘…because it is found in ordinary affairs that 
one never seeks to avoid one trouble without running into 
another; but prudence consists in knowing how to distinguish the 
character of troubles, and for choice to take the lesser evil’ 
(Prince, 181) – as Churchill on democracy – the worst of all 
systems, except others which are even worse! 
 
 Machiavelli and the two major types of political system – 
republicanism (Italy), with balance of power and constant 
oscillations, and absolutism and extreme centralization as he 
thought he detected in parts of the Islamic world – the big divide 
 
The next landmark: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan, 1651) and the 
social contract – the ‘natural’ state of human beings and how the 
State delivered the individual from universal fear. A mythical 
story, but explaining how we gained from this. And notably it 
made no reference to the divine origin of power – Leviathan was 
a contractual matter, but limits on power were only the right of 
the individual to his own life.  
 
‘The masterpiece is always the revelation of the universal 
predicament in the local and transitory mischief…’ (Oakesthott in 
intro. To Leviathan – in Civil Wars).  
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‘No arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, 
continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of man, 
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’.  
‘The condition of man is a condition of war of everyone against 
everyone’ (Hobbes Leviathan, pt. 1, ch.4) 
 
‘For warre, consisteth not in Battell only, or the act of fighting, 
but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contest by Battell is 
sufficiently knowne’ (quoted in Sahlins, Tribesmen’) 
 
Sahlins on Hobbes. ‘…the Hobbesian vision of humans in the 
natural state is almost the ‘origin myth’ of western capitalism’. 
(Morris, Western, 139)  
 
NB. No religious justification – just for fear of something worse. 
No moral justification for the state etc. Just order.  
 
The next landmark: John Locke (Treatises on Government, 
c.1689) and the contract theory – a social contract, power is 
tamed. The idea was that the contract was: an individual bound to 
obey the state as long as it preserved life, liberty, property – the 
basis for American constitution etc. But if any of these threatened, 
the contract is over. (and vice versa) Purely secular – and nothing 
to do with patriarchy, paternalism etc.  
 
‘political power, then, I take to be a right of making laws with 
penalties of death, and consequently of all less penalties for the 
regulating and preserving of all property’ (Government, 4) 
 
‘the end of law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and 
enlarge freedom’ (Government, 29) 
 
‘the great and chief end of men’s uniting into commonwealths 
and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of 
their property’ (Government, 63) 
 
‘Every man is born with a double right; first, a right to freedom to 
his person, secondly, a right before any other man, to inherit with 
his brother, his father’s goods’ (Government, 96) 
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‘Men being, as has been said, by nature all free, equal and 
independent, no one can be put out of this estate, without his own 
consent’ (Government, 49) 
 
- fundamental attack on patriarchal and ritual power 
- a great narrowing of politics down to economics and 
liberty  
 
The next landmark: Montesquieu and the separation of powers 
(Spirit of the Laws, 1748): Montesquieu surveyed all of history 
of political theory, the experience of France and England, and 
thinking about Islam (Persian Letters). How England had liberty 
– by dividing and balancing the powers. Classic formulation of 
division of judiciary, executive, legislature etc. Again absorbed 
into America.  
 
Adam Smith then explains further (Wealth of Nations 1776 and 
lectures on laws), and how the market is to be kept separate from 
the State – separation of politics and economics.  The night 
watchman state.  
 
All this encapsulated into the American and French revolutions.  
 
     The American Declaration of Independence of 1776 started 
‘We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created 
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness.’  Such an assertion would have struck 
almost everyone who ever lived as complete nonsense. It has been 
very generally assumed that some humans are by nature better, 
more intelligent, more gifted. Furthermore, no-one has 
unalienable rights to anything.  
 
There is then a backlash or questioning or probing or suggesting 
of other systems: 
 
- there is Rousseau’s absolutist and romantic view of the 
‘general will’; the idea that we should surrender all our 
power to the centre, which would benevolently give it 
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back to us, the sort of nonsense that later flourishes in 
communism 
- there is Edmund Burke’s counter-attack on revolutions 
‘Reflections on Revolution’ 
- there is Tocqueville’s questioning of whether democracy 
could not lead to the dictatorship of the people; the 
tyranny of the majority, the dangers of equality and social 
atomism, the bleak vision of the future of America 
-  
‘I am trying to imagine under what novel features despotism may 
appear in the world. In the first place, I see an innumerable 
multitude of men, alike and equal, constantly circling about in 
pursuit of the petty and banal pleasures with which they glut their 
souls. Each one of them, withdrawn into himself, is almost 
unaware of the feat of the rest…. Over this kind of men stands an 
immense, protective power which is alone responsible for 
securing their enjoyment and watching over their fate. That power 
is absolute, thoughtful of detail, orderly, provident, and gentle… 
It likes to see the citizens enjoy themselves, provided that they 
think of nothing but enjoyment. It gladly works for their 
happiness but wants to be sole agent and judge of it…’ 
(Democracy, ii, 898) 
 
- there is Marx’s romantic desire to abolish the State and 
return to the earlier, pre-Aristotelian days, a romantic idea 
that we can through the abolition of property and the 
abolition of class, make the people the rulers again, in an 
undivided world – somewhat like Rousseau.  The next 
landmark: Karl Marx and the return to Eden and abolition 
of the State and the inversion of Hegel 
 
The extension of models outside the west. 
 
Many of the thinkers above from Montesquieu onwards moved 
outside the Christian vs. Islamic theorizing which Machiavelli had 
started and tried to see how China, India etc. could be fitted in. 
But the real work of trying to set up world theories of political 
systems is the task of the re-born social sciences of the second 
half of the nineteenth century.  
 
 35 
So the third phase is the attempt to expand the western framework 
to the three-quarters of the world outside the west.  
 
An early attempt is Sir Henry Maine (Ancient Law, 1861) – 
types of political system, contract and status etc. Maine had 
worked in India and was deeply knowledgeable about non-
modern legal systems. He put forward two main arguments, 
which revolve around a stark contrast.  
 
   Maine's central aim was to explain how modern  civilization had  
emerged in certain 'progressive' societies.  His most important 
generalization was that concerning the movement from societies 
based on status (kinship, tribe) to societies based on contract (the 
State). One part of this theory is shown in his treatment of 
individual rights. His wide sweep allowed him to see 'by what 
insensible gradations the relation of man to man substituted itself 
for the relation of the individual to his family, and of families to 
each other'; 'Ancient Law...knows next to nothing of Individuals. It 
is concerned not with individuals but with Families, not with single 
human beings, but groups.' 1  
 
  This contrast between group-based and individual-based society is 
part of that movement from status to contract which Maine thought 
was the greatest of all changes.  'Starting, as from one terminus of 
history, from a condition of society in which all the relations of 
Persons are summed up in the relations of Family, we seem to have 
steadily moved towards a phase of social order in which all these 
relations arise from the free agreement of Individuals.'2 Thus, the 
relations of parent to child, master to slave, male to female, based 
on birth and ascribed status, melt before the negotiated relations of 
free individuals. It is in this sense that 'we may say that the move-
ment of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement 
from Status to Contract.'3  
 
The second great attempt here is that of Max Weber. He started 
with the west (from classical times), but later worked deeply on 
Islamic, Indian and Chinese civilizations.  He made three especial 
                                                
    1 Maine, Ancient Law, 185, 258 
    2 Maine, Ancient Law, 169 
    3 Maine, Ancient Law, 170 
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contributions. Firstly, the idea of ideal types, simplified models 
which could be used cross-culturally. In relation to politics, he 
distinguished between power and authority, explained what a state 
was, and delineated the three major forms of authority 
(traditional, charismatic, bureaucratic-rational). Later comparative 
sociologists – Eisenstadt, Wittfogel, Perry Anderson and others 
have expanded his work.   
 
Charisma, charismatic: a quality, coming from a person rather 
than from an office, that inspires intense loyalty and devotion; 
often has religious significance, linking prophet and followers.  
 
‘Today, however, we have to say that a state is a human 
community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. (note 
‘territory’)… The state is considered the sole source of the “right” 
to use violence. Hence, “politics” for us means striving to share 
power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either 
among states or among groups within a state.’ (From Max Weber, 
‘Politics as a Vocation’, p.78) 
 
The anthropological contribution 
 
The other major thread is within those encountering other political 
systems: namely anthropologists working in 3rd world countries.  
 
The discovery of many societies and civilizations which did not 
fit this whole western paradigm – in particular ‘acephalous’ 
societies. The famous preface to ‘Political Systems’ rejects all 
western political philosophy as useless  
 
‘We have not found that the theories of political philosophers 
have helped us to understand the societies we have studied and we 
consider them of little scientific value; for their conclusions are 
seldom formulated in terms of observed behaviour or capable of 
being tested by this criterion. Political philosophy has chiefly 
concerned itself with how men ought to live and what form of 
government they ought to have, rather than with what are their 
political habits and institutions.’ (Fortes and E-P, African Political 
Systems, 1940, p.4)  
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‘It will be noted that the political systems described in this book 
fall into two main categories. One group, which we refer to as 
Group A, consists of those societies which have centralized 
authority, administrative machinery and judicial institutions – in 
short, a government…. The Zulu, the Ngwato, the Bemba, the 
Banyankole and the Kede. The other group, which we refer to as 
Group B, consists of those societies which lack centralized 
authority, administrative machinery, and constituted judicial 
institutions – in short which lack government … This group 
comprises the Logoli, the Tallensi, and the Nuer.’ (Fortes and E-
P, African Political Systems, p.5) 
 
‘In our judgement, the most significant characteristic 
distinguishing the centralized, pyramidal, state-like forms of 
government… from the segmentary political systems… is the 
incidence and function of organized force in the system…’ (p.14) 
 
The nature of bands (most of history) and how they work – 
equality and dispersion. 
 
Give a brief account of band systems and how they work – 
perhaps with diags.  
 
Features (as from Ember and Ember, p.204 ff) 
- the band the political unit, usually H-Gatherers, nomadic 
usually, small size and low population density; usually 
egalitarian; little private property; politics informal, no 
leaders, there may be an informal headman, but no 
authority, just respect for wisdom etc. No fixed authority. 
The !Kung have a very weak headman ‘He is generally 
held responsible for the way the band makes us of its food 
resources… cope with quarrels, his consent is necessary 
for an outsider to be admitted to the band’ – much like 
Head of Dept. in Social Anthropology.  
- In cases like the Hadza (Woodburn) ‘minimal politics’, 
with consensus and ostracism and no leadership positions 
at all 
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The nature of segmentary feuding societies – Evans-Pritchard’s 
famous study of the Nuer, and Bohannon on the Tiv.  
- give a brief account of this, including the famous E-P 
diagram. The idea of people being joined by hate rather 
than love (Mr and Mrs Pugh; cold war etc.), balance of 
forces, feuding, the idea of segmentation of  loyalties, 
Sahlins idea of predatory systems and their advantage – as 
with Nuer versus Dinka etc. State of perpetual ‘cold war’, 
of ‘ordered anarchy’ etc., as with Iraq and much of middle 
east.  
 
- the diagram of segmentation: based on the British army? 
A split into a1, a2, a1 into parts etc. They unite in 
opposition to others. [see diag. Hann, p. 126] 
In such a situation, peace is kept by mutual opposition. 
But if broken, the role of the Leopard skin chief – rather 
like arbitration council, no power, but some authority – 
also like Gellner’s Saints of the Atlas, and like the 
Emperor of Japan. Authority (ritual) but no formal 
instituted power (e.g. police).  
 
- another system, ‘Big Men’ ,as in Melanesia: Andrew Strathern, 
Ongka’s Big Moka, very temporary, through distribution (as in 
schools, marbles etc. ) Through distribution and partying and 
obligations and debts. Big Man: Figure often found among tribal 
horticulturalists and pastoralists. The big man occupies no office 
but creates his own reputation through entrepreneurial expertise 
and generosity to others. Neither his wealth nor his position 
passes to his heirs.  
 
The start of centralization: but this ordered anarchy, as we shall 
see when we deal with blood feud etc., does not continue for ever. 
There is the puzzling question of the origins of States.  
 
Theories of origins of the state: 
 
- control over some productive resource, e.g. in the Nile 
Valley, the labour and management, hydraulic 
civilizations etc. (cf Wittfogel) 
 39 
- population growth, circumscription – combined with 
warfare; narrow coastal valleys, no way out etc. people 
forced under (perhaps combined with climatic changes?) 
- local and long-distance trade, in southern Iraq or the 
Mayan highlands, may have stimulated.  
- conquest states (Lowie) 
 
In fact, no one theory works everywhere, and a combination of 
these and other factors needed. ‘It is still not clear what the 
specific conditions were that led to the emergence of the state in 
each of the early centres’. (Ember and Ember, 217) 
 
How chiefdoms work – Malinowski and co; basically through 
mobilizing a combination of kinship and tribute, and re-
distribution of wealth.  
 
Feudalism as rather similar, except that instead of kinship the 
relations are contractual and the system of patronage is through 
bonds of allegiance.   
 
How States work – literacy, bureaucracy etc. taxation, standing 
armies etc. The classic definitions – monopoly of the use of force 
etc.   
 
The major types and forms of state system: much as outlined by 
classical theorists.  
- hydraulic civilizations 
- democracies 
- communisms 
- Japan and China 
 
Ways of approaching political systems by anthropologists. 
 
 Anthropologists tend to work in places where conventional 
political theory does not work – so they have to invent new 
frameworks. Here are a few of the most famous.  
 
Traditional structural-functionalist: the E-P generation and the 
working of feuds 
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Dynamic equilibrium models: Leach and the moving equilibrium 
of Kachin 
 
An attack on the concept of ‘the tribe’ and on equilibrium. In 
Political Systems of Highland Burma (1954) he argued that the 
Kachin region in Burma might look like one system of another at 
a point in time, in but in fact it was constantly oscillating back 
and forth between a relatively egalitarian form of politics, known 
locally as gumlao, and more hierarchical forms known as gumsa, 
in which local leaders tried to consolidate power into little 
chiefdoms. Rather similar to the oscillating equilibrium model of 
Ibn Khaldun in the C13 – with equality turning to inequality and 
back again in the battle between tribesmen and settled folk…. 
 
Individualistic transactionalism and factions of F. Barth, Political 
Leadership among Swat Pathans (1959). He ‘documented the 
ways in which individual Pathan chiefs competed with each other 
to secure followers and optimise their positions’ – some 
inspiration from game theory. Emphasized the way politics was 
like economics in that individuals were playing games where 
maximizing individual actors tried to ‘win’ (rather similar to 
formalist economics). He did not pay much attention to Islamic 
ideas and the role of religion.  
 
Extension of this to all political life: games and arenas – 
F.G.Bailey: politics very like a game, with arenas, rules, factions 
and teams, cheating, etc. Studied in India and elsewhere. 
Especially in Strategies and Spoils.  
 
While a good deal could be explained in terms of an individualist 
and transactionalist model, there was a danger of going too far. 
E.g. Abner Cohen in Two Dimensional Man (1974) criticised this 
and suggested that the symbolic dimension, the manipulation of 
symbols etc. extremely important.  
 
This has opened up a whole new area, or returned to one which 
was always present in Fortes and co. Thus we have extensive 
work on the role of rituals of succession, the nature of political 
language (M. Bloch), political symbolism (Kertzer), the use of 
traditional ritual symbolism to foment revolution (Lan), the way 
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in which in many parts of the world it is ritual and drama that 
holds the system together (as in Geertz’s theatre state) rather than 
secular mechanisms. I shall draw on some of these later in the 
lectures.  
 
The developments in political theories, and the disputes about the 
best ways to approach political systems cross-culturally took 
place in parallel in approaches to law. In the third lecture I will 
look at this, particularly in relation to the famous dispute about 
whether western legal models work elsewhere.  
 
The current world 
 
- empires and new powers (India, China, Japan etc.) 
- new communications and interpersonal 
relations(television, internet etc.) 
- the collapse of communism and dominance of one power 
- the threat of terror and the threat to democracy 
 
Because of all this, much more suitable for anthropological than 
any other kind of approach, since many varieties, and the 
application of classical western models much less satisfactory. 
We also feel that the separations of modernity are at a price, and 
fictions – as Latour ‘We Have Never Been Modern’ or the 
penetration and dominance of power, as in Foucault’s various 
works.  
 
So we have to use whatever tools we have, and the ideas of 
anthropology, which incorporate and try to stretch outside the 
famous western tradition of political analysis particularly apposite 
and important.  
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2.  Nations, feud and war 
 
Nations and nationalism, the invention of nations; theories of 
nationalism; consequences of nationalism; the invention of 
identities; organized violence through history; feuds and feuding; 
the development of war and its causes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://downloads.sms.cam.ac.uk/1411646/1411651.m4v 
 
Reading 
Hann, Social Anthropology, chs. 12, 14 
Thomas H.Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism (2nd edn., 2002), 
ch.6 
Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (1983) 
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (1991) 
J. Black-Michaud, Cohesive Force (republished as Feuding 
Societies) (1975) 
David Riches (ed.). The Anthropology of Violence (1986) 
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NOTES ON WHICH THE LECTURE WAS BASED 
 
Part 1: Nations and nationalism: the inventions of nations 
 
If I asked you, what is your nationality – what would you answer? 
 
If I asked you how long nations had been around – including 
yours, how long would you say? 
 
Behind your answers there is the idea of the nation, that is a 
bounded political, linguistic, cultural and territorial unit. You 
might assume that your idea of belonging to a nation-state is 
common, indeed universal, and has long been the situation of 
most people on earth. This can be questioned.  
 
There is a large argument about what nations are, when they 
emerged and what caused such an emergence.  
 
Let us start with a definition: Anthony Smith, one of the clearest 
thinkers on nationalism, writes that “’Nationalism’ signifies both 
an ideological doctrine and a wider symbolic universe and fund of 
sentiments. The ideology holds that the world consists of separate, 
identifiable nations, each with its peculiar character; that the 
nation is the sole legitimate source of political power; that every 
individual must belong and owe supreme loyalty to one and only 
one nation; and that nations must be autonomous, preferably in 
states of their own, for only then can global freedom and peace be 
assured. To this ‘core doctrine’, nationalists add their own 
secondary elaborations…’ (in ed. Ingold, p.725) 
 
Now, with these definitions, let us look at the broad types of 
historical society.  
 
Clearly HG’s have no nation; there are identities, but no nation.  
 
Tribes have no nations (except in the sense of ‘first nations’ in 
America etc.) 
 
Most peasant civilizations have no nations.  
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The nation state as a modern invention.  
 
     Many people now argue that the nation-state is really an 
invention of the last two hundred years in most of the world.  
 
For example, the sociologist Michael Mann (in Hall, ed. 
Transition, p.138) writes that ‘…”nationalism”, both as ideology 
and movement, is a wholly modern phenomenon’ 
 
The two famous theorists who have discussed this are the so-
called ‘modernists’, Ernest Gellner (Nations and Nationalism) and 
Benedict Anderson (Imagined Communities).  
 
They pointed out that there were no nations in India or Africa, or 
in the Near or Far East in 1800. There were states and Empires, 
but if you asked people ‘What nation do you belong to?’ they 
would not have understood your question. If you had changed the 
question to ‘What is your people?’ or ‘What do you call 
yourself?’, you would have got surprising answers. Even in 
France, Italy, Germany or Spain by 1850 people did not think of 
themselves as French, Italians, Germans or Spanish, but rather 
Bretons, Gascons, Lombards, Basques, Andalusians and so on.  
 
     Most of the inhabitants of France only began to think of 
themselves as primarily French after about 1870, and the same 
was true in all the countries of continental Europe. The change 
occurred even later in the rest of the world such as Eastern Europe 
or the Middle East. In many parts of the world it is only just 
happening. When I went to the Himalayas in the late 1960’s the 
people I worked with in the central hills referred to the 
Kathmandu Valley alone as ‘Nepal’. They thought they lived 
outside Nepal, in their own village and group and region, though 
on the map it was all ‘Nepal’.   
 
Invented  communities 
 
    In the famous phrase of Benedict Anderson, the title of his 
book, nations are ‘invented communities’, where people who do 
not know each other and often have little in common come to 
think of themselves as ‘the British’ or ‘the French’.  
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In fact, the idea that as people move out of small communities 
where they know everyone, they have to ‘invent’ or ‘imagine’ a 
community with a much wider group often extending to millions 
of people was put forward also by De Tocqueville in the early 
C19.  
 
He explained that the Americans had created an ‘imagined 
community’ to hold together, through ideology, an equal peoples 
who thus needed few police, no central bureaucracy, no standing 
army. Using “ideal” in the sense of imagined, he wrote that ‘The 
government of the Union rests almost entirely on legal fictions. 
The Union is an ideal nation which exists, so to say, only in men’s 
minds and whose extent and limits can only be discerned by the 
understanding.’ (Democracy, I,202) This ‘imagined’ community 
was highly artificial, manufactures, yet it felt “natural”.’  
 
    As for the causes of  this imaginative construction, there are 
various theories.  
 
Tocqueville put it down to the American ability to form numerous 
associations with strangers for all sorts of purposes. He also saw 
the role of printing and newspapers.  
 
This second argument has been repeated by many since. For 
example, Innis (Communication, 55) wrote in the early C20 that 
‘By the end of the sixteenth century the flexibility of the alphabet 
and printing had contributed to the growth of diverse vernacular 
literatures and had provided a basis for divisive nationalism in 
Europe’. His disciple Marshall McLuchan in Understanding 
Media (175-6) made the idea famous. ‘Of the many unforeseen 
consequences of typography, the emergence of nationalism is, 
perhaps the most familiar. Political unification of populations by 
means of vernacular and language groupings was unthinkable 
before printing turned each vernacular into an extensive mass 
medium. The tribe, an extended form of family of blood relatives, 
is exploded by print, and is replaced by an association of men 
homogeneously trained to be individuals…’ He suggested that 
electric media, which were just starting in his time, would 
undermine nationalism, leading to the famous ‘global village’.  
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It is curious that Anderson, who fails to mention Tocqueville, also 
has no mention of Innis or McLuchan when he talks about the 
effects of print-capitalism, as he calls it, in creating nationalism.  
 
    Talk of capitalism, takes us into the second major set of 
theories. There is Anderson’s that the market economy, with its 
impersonality, monetized values, urban way of life, division of 
labour individualism, ironing out of regional differences, was one 
of the two great factors behind nationalism. He dates this from the 
eighteenth century, though any deep knowledge of history would 
have reminded him that capitalism is much older than that.  
 
     A variant of this is found in Ernest Gellner’s theory that the 
root cause is the economic and social shift from agrarian to 
industrial societies. A new world is born on endless growth, a 
high division of labour, high social mobility. In order for this to 
work efficiently, the high culture of the elite must permeate down 
to all levels and this is achieved through the educational system 
and the manipulation of symbolic capital so that everyone feels 
that not only do they belong to a state but also a nation. So with 
this theory, the development of nationalism more or less parallels 
the growth of industrialization. England became industrial from 
the 1780’s, Germany and France from the 1860’s, and this 
coincides with nationalism. The emphasis on education and 
symbols is brilliantly executed, but the fit is not perfect. As Mann 
writes, ‘a cursory review of the historical evidence might suggest 
that industrialisation – and state-funded universal education – 
came a little too late to explain nationalism’ (Mann in Hall, ed. 
Transition, 139).  
 
So Mann instead suggests that there were two causes, which 
take it back a little in time, ‘the emergence of commercial 
capitalism and its universal social classes’ and ‘the emergence of 
the modern state and its professional armed forces and 
administrators’ (which turns it into something C16-C17). (Hall, 
Transition, 162).  
 
     In fact, there are probably two strands. There is the continental 
European tradition with which Gellner, Anderson, Hobsbawm and 
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others mainly are concerned, which are very recent, and then 
another, older strand. This is the subject of Anthony Smith’s work 
on the Ethnic Origin of Nations.  
 
He talks of ‘two kinds of nation: the “old, continuous” nations of 
Western Europe (France, England, Holland, Spain, Sweden) and 
the new ‘nations of design’ in Central and Eastern Europe and 
Asia. The first type of nation preceded the rise of nationalism in 
the eighteenth century, and was the result of unplanned processes. 
The second type followed the rise of nationalism and was largely 
the result of political movements and nationalist programmes, 
often in the wake of wars and treaties.’ 
 
In fact, I think it would be better to separate off the European into 
the middling old – France, Spain) the older (Portugal, Sweden, 
Holland) and the very old indeed – England.  
 
 
      For, by chance, those who live in England (or Japan)  happen 
to live in a somewhat older nation. Because they live on a small 
island which early adopted a common language, law, economy 
and set of political institutions, these islanders have been 
becoming a nation for a thousand years. If you had asked 
someone what nation he belonged to five hundred years ago he 
might well have said ‘England’. Then the English became British 
when the King of Scotland also became the King of England in 
1603 and Scots and English people settled in Ireland from the 
seventeenth century. Now they are becoming English, Scottish, 
Welsh or Irish again.  
 
The consequences of nationalism 
 
      We fight wars and discriminate against outsiders and 
immigrants as if there were such things as nations, but they are 
just lines on a map. Nations are constructed and deconstructed. 
There is nothing natural or given about them. They are imagined, 
invented, concepts and there is no British nation, English nation, 
except in our imagination. Some even say that they are short-lived 
fictions and that the age of the nation-state will soon be over as 
we merge in a global world. And not before time according to 
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many of those who have suffered the vicious effects of 
nationalism like the refugee Albert Einstein who wrote that 
‘Nationalism is an infantile disease. It is the measles of mankind.’  
 
    Certainly what it means to be ‘English’ and ‘British’,  as you 
will find, will fluctuate over your lifetime and your feelings of 
national identity will alter enormously. As it shifts back and forth, 
is aroused by war cries or lulled by talk of European integration, it 
is good to remember what a constructed thing it is. The same is 
true of those who live in most of the nations of the world, whether 
in Cyprus, Israel, Japan, North Korea, Vietnam or elsewhere. The 
pulse of national identity slows and quickens, and the very 
meaning of ‘being’ of a certain nation changes deeply as the 
world changes around a group of people. 
 
The invention of identities through amnesia and eliding 
 
       We also invent our origins. We easily slip into the idea that 
the things around us were discovered, or at least basically 
adapted, by our own society. Yet if you think for a moment you 
will find that almost everything was invented in other 
civilizations.  
 
     The anthropologist Ralph Linton described the average 
American as follows. He ‘awakens in a bed built on a pattern 
which originated in the Near East…. He throws back covers made 
from cotton, domesticated in India, or linen, domesticated in the 
Near East… He takes off his pyjamas, a garment invented in 
India, and washes with soap invented by the ancient 
Gauls…Before going out for breakfast he glances through the 
window, made of glass invented in Egypt, and if it is raining puts 
on overshoes made of rubber discovered by the Central American 
Indians and takes an umbrella, invented in south-eastern Asia…  
On his way to breakfast he stops to buy a paper, paying for it with 
coins, an ancient Lydian invention…His plate is of steel, an alloy 
first made in southern India, his fork a medieval Italian invention, 
and his spoon a derivative of a Roman original.’  
 
     We have only reached breakfast and through the day the 
assemblage of world cultures continues. Nevertheless, at the end, 
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‘As he absorbs the accounts of foreign troubles he will, if he is a 
good conservative citizen, thank a Hebrew deity in an  Indo-
European language that he is 100 percent American.’  
 
     So we are all composites of history, built up from our past. 
England is a particularly obvious example of this because, being 
part of a small island near a great Continent, and being a trading 
and imperial nation, it has sucked in almost all of its culture from 
abroad. There is scarcely anything, in music, painting, 
architecture, science and knowledge, up to the eighteenth century 
at least, which was not largely the result of borrowings.  
 
      Many of the characteristically ‘local’ things were imported 
from elsewhere. Much of modern India is of British origin, just as 
Britain is of Indian origin. Much of modern Japan was imported 
from China, just as much of present China was ‘made in Japan’. 
Australia, just like North America, is a basket of foreign imports. 
We borrow, imitate, trade and steal and then conveniently forget.  
 
How do we invent our lives? 
 
    Since nations are invented and there is no actual thing out there 
which is essentially ‘American’ or ‘British’ or ‘French’ or 
‘Japanese’ or whatever. It is worth thinking about how we 
construct these categories and come to accept them. As a number 
of analysts such as Hobsbawm and Ranger, David Kertzer and 
others have explained,  
nations are built by using political symbols to make us believe in 
their unity. 
 
     As Anthony Smith points out, there is a wider ‘culture of 
nationalism’, that is ‘the panoply of symbols and rituals 
associated with the drama of the nation.’ As he puts it, ‘the union 
of the citizens in a political community is founded upon a myth of 
fictive descent and heroic destiny’. And to support this, there is 
‘the whole gamut of symbols that express the culture and evoke 
the salvation drama of the nation. In the nation’s flags and 
anthems, its memorials and monuments, its parades and 
ceremonies, its coins and insignia, its capitals and assemblies, its 
arts and crafts, and its music and dance (and food! AM) are 
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distilled the pride and hope of a ‘community of history and 
destiny’ which seeks to shape events and mould itself in the 
image of its ideals.’ (Smith in ed. Ingold, pp.725-6) 
 
As Smith points out, it is all very Durkheimian. ‘There can be no 
society which does not feel the need of upholding and reaffirming 
at regular intervals the collective sentiments and the collective 
ideas which makes its unity and its personality.’ (quoted on 
p.726) 
 
So our identities, of which the national is an important one, is the 
result of playing with history – re-writing the past and inventing 
the future.  
 
       The art of creating a nation is the art of forgetting as Ernest 
Renan pointed out over a century ago. That is to say forgetting the 
many things that divide us and concentrating on those that unite.  
The wounds in many parts of the world such as the Balkans or 
Ireland will only be healed when people learn to forget, or at least 
put on one side, past bitterness and memories. This is not just a 
negative process of amnesia. There is also a positive building up 
of unifying symbols, what is known as the invention of tradition.  
 
    Humans are very good at accepting common traditions, shared 
histories and ways of doing things, which after a very short time 
appear to have been there for ever. This is universal. For example, 
the famous horse-race in Siena called the Palio, which many 
people think has been continuously held for 600 years was, in 
fact, abandoned centuries ago and has been invented, or re-
invented, recently. 
 
    In England there are new ‘traditions’ being invented all the 
time. In Cambridge, for example, the very ‘traditional’ festival of 
Nine Lessons in King’s College, which has become an icon of 
Englishness when it is beamed all over the world on Christmas 
Eve, was invented in the early twentieth century. Admittedly it 
has bits and pieces of older words and music in it, but the form 
and structure is twentieth century.  
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 In fact, almost always if you look at some royal ceremonial 
such as a coronation service or wedding, most of it has been 
invented or heavily adapted for the present purpose. The same is 
true abroad. The tradition of clapping after a lecture or 
performance was unknown in Japan in 1870. The first recorded 
clap was made by a missionary in the speech hall at Keio 
University. Thereafter the Japanese learnt to clap and thought of it 
as the normal way to behave.  
 
Very much of what we think of as old and unchangeable and 
‘natural’ in our own culture was a deliberate invention of only a 
few years ago. Even in the family or school  we see this. We 
invent traditions about Christmas celebrations in one year and 
then the next year feel as if we had always done them. And it is 
not just actions. Few people who go on tours round Cambridge 
realize that almost all the buildings  they see are quite recent, less 
than two hundred years old. The city feels ancient, but it is 
constantly evolving and being re-invented.  
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3.  Law and confl ict  resolution 
 
Definitions and functions of law; how to compare legal systems; the 
‘reasonable man (woman)’; status and contract systems; equality 
and individual rights; the rule of law; how courts work; juries and 
torture. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://downloads.sms.cam.ac.uk/1411663/1411668.m4v 
 
Reading 
Hann, Social Anthropology, ch. 13 
Simon Roberts, Order and Dispute (1979) [for a more recent 
summary, see ‘Law and Dispute Processes’ in Ingold, Companion 
Encyclopedia, cited above.]  
P.Bohannon, Justice and Judgment among the Tiv (1957) 
M.Gluckman, Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal Societies (1965), 
section on Law. 
P.Bohannon (ed.), Law and Warfare (1967) 
 
 53 
NOTES ON WHICH LECTURE WAS BASED 
 
LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
Definitions: what is law and what are its functions 
 
A definition of law: 
 
"A social norm is legal if its neglect or infraction is regularly met, 
in threat or in fact, by the application of physical force by an 
individual or group possessing the socially recognized right of so 
acting". (Hoebel, 1954: 28) 
 
From this it is clear that all societies without a State do not have 
Law, but may have many laws.  
 
Functions of law: 
 
Law has four major functions, according to Hoebel: 
 
“i. to identify acceptable lines of behaviour for inclusion in the 
culture and to penalize contradictory behaviour 
 
ii. to allocate authority and to determine who may legitimately 
apply force to maintain the legal norms 
 
iii. to settle trouble cases as they arise 
 
iv. to redefine relationships as the conditions of life change..." 
(Hoebel, Man in Prim. World, p.484). 
 
Difficulty of comparing legal systems: how do we compare? 
 
    As in all branches of anthropology, there is a tension between 
'formalist' and 'substantivist' approaches to the subject.  
 
     One can chose between the application of formal models taken 
from 'modern' societies to 'other' societies, which makes comparison 
possible - but diminishes accuracy, or the detailed study of each 
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system in its own rights, which is more accurate but ultimately leads 
to incomparable studies.  
 
   This problem is particularly marked in legal anthropology because 
of the highly elaborated analysis of law in the western tradition, 
whether Anglo-American or Roman. As Gluckman admits: "In 
analysing legal problems in an African society one has to use terms 
and concepts which have been employed by jurists through two 
millennia..."(Process,xix). Or as Bohannan writes: "Because of its 
tremendous field of assumption and undefined premises, 'law' 
probably has one of the most extensive foundations of ethnocentric 
metaphysic of any discipline" (Justice, 213).  
 
   The peculiarity of western civilization is both a cause of, and 
manifested in, its legal analysis: "Western civilization and the 
classical cultures on which it has risen examine their legal 
institutions from a peculiar point of view" (Bohannon, Soc.Anth, 
285). The great danger is to impose this peculiarity on others. "I 
consider it to be the cardinal error of ethnographic and social 
analysis: the grossly ethnocentric practice of raising folk systems 
like 'the law' designed for social action in one's own society, to the 
status of an analytic system..." (Bohannan, Justice, 69). This is 
endorsed by Simon Roberts, who describes a number of studies of 
African customary law which "are all flawed by an underlying 
assumption that the material they are dealing with can safely be 
submitted to those forms of analysis which lawyers use upon 
English law" (Order, 195). All too often, he writes, "the ill-effects of 
a grounding in western legal theory become apparent in empirical 
studies". For example, it leads to the artificial isolation of 'legal' data 
from other relevant material on dispute settlement, and to the 
imposition of legal concepts; all rules are treated as legal rules, all 
peace-makers are 'judges' etc. (Roberts, 193) 
 
Some attempted solutions to the dilemma; how do we compare? 
 
One strategy is to distinguish firmly between folk (emic) and 
analytic (etic) systems. Bohannan thus stressed that we need to 
distinguish the concepts which are particular to a culture, e.g. the 
'folk' concepts of English, Roman, Trobriand, Tiv or other legal 
systems, from the analytic concepts of a comparative approach - as 
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partially embodied in the science of comparative jurisprudence 
(Justice, 5).  
 
We must not give our own legal system a privileged status. We 
need some superior system (Justice, 214), perhaps something along 
the value-free, mathematical, notation which Edmund Leach 
suggested (in Rethinking Anthropology), in order to get over 
exactly the same problems in the use of western ideas like 
'marriage', the 'family', 'father' etc.   
 
The idea of the reasonable man and what it reveals 
 
A second approach is to try to find some lowest common 
denominator: rather like the assumptions of politics (power 
maximization) or economics (profit maximization).  
 
    The major attempt to do this was made by Gluckman to provide a 
basis for the comparative study of law, and to show that, in essence, 
all legal systems were the same. This was the concept of the 
'reasonable man'.  
 
    The importance of this concept, for Gluckman, is fundamental. If 
it is true, as he argues, that 'the reasonable man is recognized as the 
central figure in all developed systems of law" (Justice, p.83), then, 
if the 'reasonable man' can also be found in Lozi and simpler 
systems, the basic similarity of all legal systems will be established. 
Their basic premise is the same - just as, if Adam Smith is right that 
'exchanging man' is fundamental, then all economic systems can be 
compared as in formalist economics.  
 
    What then, does the concept of the 'reasonable man’ mean in 
western law? Gluckman refers to, and obviously derived the idea 
from, what he describes as A.P.Herbert's 'magnificent' description 
of the concept in relation to English law, though he fails to quote 
Herbert, Uncommon Law. It is worth quoting the original essay to 
establish what we are dealing with. 
 
   In defending his client, a woman who had through her reckless 
motor boat driving caused an aged gentleman's punt to sink, Sir 
Ethelred Rutt put forward the following argument.  
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"The Common Law of England has been laboriously built about a 
mythical figure - the figure of 'The Reasonable Man'. In field of 
jurisprudence this legendary individual occupies the place which in 
another science is held by the Economic Man, and in social and 
political discussions by the Average or Plain Man. He is an ideal, a 
standard, the embodiment of all those qualities which we demand of 
the good citizen. No matter what may be the particular department 
of human life which falls to be considered in these Courts, sooner or 
later we have to face the question: Was this or was it not the 
conduct of a reasonable man? Did the defendant take such care to 
avoid shooting the plaintiff in the stomach as might reasonably be 
expected of a reasonable man? Did the plaintiff take such 
precautions to inform himself of the circumstances as any 
reasonable man would expect of an ordinary person having the 
ordinary knowledge of an ordinary person of the habits of wild bulls 
when goaded with garden-forks and the persistent agitation of red 
flags?" 
 
    Now Herbert's particular humorous twist to this definition, is to 
take the gender literally; namely that there has never been any 
mention of the reasonable woman, and that therefore most law does 
not apply to women. But let us look at some of the implications of 
the concept in the western setting. 
 
i. There is a considerable emphasis on citizenship, on the 
requirements of all citizens to behave by the same standards 
towards each other. There is no particularity. The behaviour is 
universalistic. 
ii. In other words there is no distinction by role or by status. The 
reasonable behaviour of the rich and the poor, of the policeman or 
the coal man, of the old person or the young person, of the lord or 
the commoner, of the married or the unmarried are expected to be 
identical.  
iii. There is not even gender differentiation; the absence of the 
'reasonable woman' can not, in fact, be interpreted as omitting 
women, but arising from the assumption that there is no implicit 
difference between the standards and norms of men and women. 
The 'reasonable person' would be a good substitute.  
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iv. The purpose of the 'reasonable man' concept is not to use it as a 
way of judging evidence, of cross-examining, but rather as a way of 
allocating responsibility. In the breach of an implicit contract, when 
an injury has been alleged, who is at fault? It helps decision making, 
judgment.  
 
    This is what the idea means in western law. What, then, does it 
mean among the Lozi, according to Gluckman? Gluckman cites a 
number of cases which he argues suggest a similar use.  
 
   In the first, a man "did not behave as a reasonable man would do 
when arbitrating in a fight; second, his whole behaviour was not that 
of a reasonable induna (councilor?), following the customs of a 
good induna" (p.87) 
 
    Gluckman tells us that the court's main technique in 
cross-examination is therefore to state the norms of behaviour of a 
specific position; in other words how the reasonable man is likely to 
act in a perhaps unique situation. Whenever a party's own account 
of what they said or did shows deviations from these norms, the 
judges are able to attack him for lying. In this case it becomes clear 
that Gluckman has slipped away from the Herbert model and is 
putting forward the 'Reasonable Man' concept as a tool to establish 
truth in cross-examination. 
 
   Gluckman further shows that it is not the generalized 'Reasonable 
Man' idea that is used, applying to all citizens, but rather the specific 
reasonable performance of a particular role. He writes: "The norm 
of the reasonable man is thus differentiated both in 
cross-examination and in judgment, according to the social 
positions of the parties" (p.94). Gluckman half realized the total 
transformation he is making in the idea in a re-definition which he 
casually slipped in: "This use of the 'reasonable man' - or rather the 
reasonable and customary incumbent of a particular social 
position..." (p.94). This is the complete opposite of the concept as 
elaborated by Herbert, which is precisely not tied to a 'particular 
social position'.  
 
   Gluckman further elaborates this when discussing whether the 
Lozi have any word for 'the reasonable man'. He admits that they do 
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not have such a word, but claims that "the reasonable man is usually 
implicitly present when they contrast reported behaviour with the 
norms of behaviour of particular positions (my emphasis) (p.125). 
He elaborates this by saying that "Lozi judges do not make 
continual explicit use of the general phrase for a reasonable man 
because in most cases they are giving judgments on the behaviour 
of persons occupying specific social positions in multiplex 
relations - they are chiefly concerned with relationships of status. 
Therefore the judges more often work explicitly with the phrases 'a 
good husband', a 'sensible induna' and so on." (p.126).  
 
In fact, what it all shows, is the great difference between two major 
legal systems which reflect two different types of society.  
 
The Mainean distinction between status and contract 
 
    What Gluckman has, in fact, shown, is the vast difference 
between legal systems in the modern West and parts of Africa. One 
way to bring this difference into focus is to set up a simple model of 
those great contrasts established by nineteenth century thinkers, 
along the following lines: 
 
Tonnies            Community                Association 
Durkheim         Mechanical               Organic     solidarity 
Maine               Status                        Contract 
 
    In relation to law, the most famous formulation of this contrast 
was drawn by Sir Henry Maine. In a famous passage (quoted 
earlier?) he wrote: 
 
"The movement of the progressive societies has been uniform in 
one respect. Through all its course it has been distinguished by the 
gradual dissolution of family dependency, and the growth of 
individual obligation in its place. The Individual is steadily 
substituted for the Family, as the unit of which civil laws take 
account... Starting, as from one terminus of history, from a 
condition of society in which all the relations of Persons are 
summed up in the relations of Family, we seem to have steadily 
moved towards a phase of social order in which all these relations 
arise from the agreement of Individuals."  
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     For instance, in western Europe, instead of a status relationship 
(slaves and masters), one has contractual relations - servant and 
master, worker and employer etc; or again the relations between 
husband and wife, father and son, and everyone are contractual. 
Only children and the insane are exceptions and that is because 
"they do not possess the faculty of forming a judgment of their own 
interests; in other words, they are wanting in the first essential an 
engagement by Contract.  
 
    Maine limits 'Status' to mean largely birth relations within the 
family; "All the forms of Status taken notice of in the Law of 
Persons were derived from, and to some extent are still coloured by, 
the powers and privileges anciently residing in the Family". 
 
He then ends up with the famous conclusion that "the movement of 
the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status 
to Contract" (Maine, Ancient Law, 169-70; his italics) 
 
   From this it can be said that "the society of our day is mainly 
distinguished from that of preceding generations by the largeness of 
the sphere which is occupied in it by contract" (Ancient, 304).  
 
    Thus Bohannan defines status as "a set of rights and obligations 
that are inherent in social positions (achieved in any other way than 
by contract), in other words, usually by birth - what sociologists call 
ascription. 'Contract' he defines as "a set of right and duties initially 
assumed voluntarily by the parties in the contract" (Anthropology, 
155); i.e. achievement. Using his definition, we could include under 
'status' differences, slavery, case, nobility-caste relations, age and 
gender differences in many societies.  
 
    This theoretical opposition is of fundamental importance in the 
comparative study of law. Legal systems reflect the social 
organization of the societies in which they exist, and if these are 
entirely different, so will be the legal systems.  
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Some peculiarities of the system flowing from this distinction 
 
     In the majority of societies, the legal process is embedded 
within social life. When I worked in a Himalayan village, for 
example, no one would dream of going to a court to sort things 
out. Villagers would assemble on a verandah and older men and 
women would deliver their opinion on the matter. After a long 
period of discussion, the dispute would be settled without a clear 
winner or loser.       
 
      So law in our society is a strange process which in many ways 
goes against the grain of ordinary life. A court is basically a place 
where people behave in an odd way. They bring their disputes to a 
complete stranger and after listening and asking questions he or 
she says one is in the right and the other in the wrong.  
 
       If going to court is a strange thing to do, going to an English 
or American court is an extreme form of this peculiarity from the 
viewpoint of most societies.  You are asked to ‘tell the truth, the 
whole truth and nothing but the truth’. In most societies there is 
no belief that there is an abstract thing called ‘truth’. There are 
believed to be many conflicting types of truth, factual, social, 
religious, mythical. As with the Tiv, there are several words for 
‘truth’. The same in Japan, where there is no idea that there is a 
thing called ‘the truth’. Each interpretation is ‘true’ in a different 
way. Furthermore, no-one but a lunatic or a traitor would tell the 
court something that would hurt their family or friends. People are 
expected to lie, or at least to tell partial truths. 
 
      Furthermore, there is the famous ‘Rashomon effect’ after the 
film of Kurosawa, whereby five people witnessing the same event 
told a different story – they literally saw a different set of events 
because of their social relationship to what was happening.  
 
The assumption of equality before the law 
 
      Much of law in most societies is concerned with deciding 
about the behaviour of people who are by birth or achieved 
position unequal. In Anglo-American law, it is about deciding 
between people who are considered to be on a level, not 
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intrinsically unequal, even if they appear strikingly different in 
their education, sex, wealth, race.  
 
       Almost everywhere else, men and women, rich and poor, old 
and young are assumed to be ‘reasonable’ in very different ways. 
Furthermore, reasonable behaviour entirely depends on the social 
relationship involved. It is reasonable for a man to strike his wife 
or his son, highly unreasonable for a woman or son to strike back. 
It is reasonable for an uncle to find a job in his office for his 
nephew, but not reasonable to find jobs for unrelated people. It is 
reasonable to pay a bribe to a customs officer or policeman, but 
not to someone who has no power. 
 
The assumption of individual rights 
 
       It is assumed in modern law that individuals have rights. 
Men, women, children, disabled people, even the unborn foetus or 
animals have intrinsic ‘rights’. Very few societies in the world 
share this view. It is usually thought that an individual only exists 
as part of a group, he or she has rights in relation to others, which 
are inseparable from responsibilities. There are no innate rights 
which come with birth.  
 
       The idea that, in the words of the American Declaration of 
Independence, ‘life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness’ are 
intrinsic and inextinguishable human rights would be regarded by 
a large part of the world, even today, and certainly over most of 
history, as an outrageous claim. When the idea was imported into 
India in the nineteenth century by the British it caused immense 
confusion and disapproval. A member of a lower caste, a woman, 
a child, had never been conceived of as having the same rights as 
a high caste person, a man, an adult.  
 
       This assumption of individual human rights is a very old 
feature of English law. It has now spread over the world and 
become a central doctrine of a new form of mission activity. It has 
many merits.  When taken to extremes, without attention to the 
counter-balancing rights of communities and groups, or the 
responsibilities that go with the rights, it is as dangerous as 
rightlessness.  
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The rule of law  
  
   We often hear about how important the ‘rule of law’ is. For 
example, many people looking at the development of China, India or 
Iraq say that it is essential that they subscribe to ‘the rule of law’. 
But what does the ‘rule of law’ mean? 
 
The classic exposition is by A.V. Dicey in his Study of the Law of 
the Constitution.   
  
The primary meaning is the supremacy of law in dispute settlement.  
  
"We mean, in the first place, that no man is punishable or can be 
lawfully made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach 
of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary 
Courts of the land. In this sense the rule of law is contrasted with 
every system of government based on the exercise by persons in 
authority of wide, arbitrary, or discretionary powers of 
constraint...."  (pp.179-180) -  i.e.  "the  absolute 
supremacy  or  predominance  of regular law  as  opposed  to  the 
influence of arbitrary power..." (l93)  
  
    Another aspect of this is that disputes must be settled through 
legal channels. As Roberts points out, "In its sphere (law) enjoys a 
position of absolute supremacy:  all   other normative systems give 
way to legal rules; and the courts are ultimately the authoritative 
agencies of dispute settlement. Even though this supremacy is 
seldom questioned it is jealously guarded and very vigorously 
defendant at the slightest hint of Challenge, by the courts themselves 
as well as by parliament and the executive. For this purpose the 
courts have available to them the contempt procedures, a main 
function of which is to stifle alternative methods of dispute 
settlement.  
 
 In most societies, even where there are judicial institutions, they "do 
not always enjoy the unchallenged pre-eminence in the business of 
dispute  
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settlement  which our  courts claim and manage to  exercise." 
(Roberts,  26).  Other  equally important  methods  are  fighting 
(incl. feud), supernatural agencies (witchcraft, magic), shaming, 
ridicule,   ostracism   and  withdrawal   of   reciprocity   (cf. 
Malinowski). 
 
 There is, as Roberts points out, a normative bias in our  own legal 
system towards settlement by talking  rather  than physical violence. 
This is not unique to 'modern' societies;  for example  among  the 
S.African  Kgatla,  documented  by  Schapera, "settlement-direct 
talk enjoys pre-eminence as a mode of handling disputes,  which 
such means as violent self-help and sorcery  are 
strongly  disapproved" (Roberts,15l). The same would be  true  of 
the Gurungs of Nepal, where I worked and many other societies.  
  
A second feature, which we have already noted, is equality before 
the law.     
  
"We  mean in the second place,...not only that with us no man  is 
above  the law, but (what is a different thing) that  every  man, 
whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law 
of  the  realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of  the  ordinary 
tribunals..." (185) - i.e. "equality before the law, or the equal 
subjection  of  all classes to the ordinary law of  the  land..."  
(l93)  
  
The package which we call the 'rule of law', which  underpins 
modern  democratic capitalism, is relatively unusual. It did  not 
exist  in most of the world until the twentieth century.  Yet  we until 
recently took it for granted. E.P.Thompson rightly comments 
that  the rise of the 'rule of law' "seems to me a cultural 
achievement  of universal significance". (Thompson, Whigs and 
Hunters, 265).  
 
How do courts work when there is a state and law is 
institutionalized? 
 
      The great problem is to persuade people to accept what you 
are doing in the legal process. Law is a dramatic and often 
elaborate affair. People dress up in archaic costumes, the judge 
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sits high up above the court, long-sounding words are used in a 
strangely formal way. There are often dramatic public 
punishments, as in the so-called ‘theatre of Tyburn’ where 
criminals were taken through the streets and executed before the 
crowds in eighteenth century England.  
 
       The legal process takes people out of their ordinary lives 
where they have become entangled in conflicts. It puts them in an 
arena that is out of normal time and space. The procedure in the 
court then re-arranges their lives. You have to exert a lot of 
pressure in order to persuade people to follow a decision which 
they may think is against their interest.  Hence it has to have a 
high ritual component, otherwise it is unlikely to be persuasive 
enough. It must mystify and impress. Yet while there is an 
element of ritual, there is also something of a game – a hybrid or 
ritualized game.  
 
      So the law is like a game of tennis. People go to a ‘court’. 
They play a combative game, either on their own behalf or 
through their representatives, serving, returning, trying to outwit 
their opponents. The judge is the umpire. After the case is heard, 
their world is changed. One side has won, the other lost. 
 
What are juries and why are they so important? 
 
      In almost all serious legal cases you have a confrontation 
between the State and the Citizen or Subject. The State has almost 
all the power and the single individual is inherently very weak. So 
if the State says ‘you are suspected of an offence’ how can you 
defend yourself?  
 
      When you have a jury system, where it is the duty of your 
equals (or peers) to decide your guilt or innocence, everything is 
changed. The jury are not themselves on trial but observers and 
arbiters. It is one thing to grind down a single individual who is 
already accused of an offence. It is entirely different to be able to 
persuade twelve, free, moderately affluent and reasonably 
educated individuals who have been told on oath to judge as fairly 
as possible without fear or favour. 
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       So the jury acts as a filter to State power, a protection for the 
single citizen or subject. It is a key institution in any democracy. 
Most countries in western Europe had juries of a sort a thousand 
years ago. Yet almost all had given up the jury system by the 
eighteenth century. England maintained a jury system up to the 
present. There are now increasing calls by politicians for its 
abolition in a wide range of cases.  
 
    The idea that the final decision that a person should be 
imprisoned, or even put to death, lies with one's peers is a curious 
and unique institution originally confined to Germanic- based legal 
systems. The roots have often been investigated, but never really 
found. Its existence is always under threat (as e.g. Edward 
Thompson claimed, Writing by Candlelight, since it can be a 
nuisance to the powers that be.  
 
    The fact that it has been so difficult to introduce jury systems into 
other social structures - the failure in Japan is a particularly 
interesting negative case - is revealing. The process assumes that the 
jury and the accused are all of a roughly similar level, though in 
most societies this is not the case. The fact that no such system was 
known in continental Europe under Roman Law and in most 
non-European empires is significant. How could twelve 'impartial', 
intelligent, people be found; how could they apply abstract 
principles of citizenship and reasonableness. How could they come 
to believe in a single fact and a single truth? It is all very odd.   
 
     Yet, as Sir Ethelred Rutt pointed out, it is the keystone of our 
liberties.  
 
"The Reasonable Man is fed and kept alive by the most valued and 
enduring of our juridical institutions - the common jury. Hateful as 
he must necessarily be to any ordinary citizen who privately 
considers him, it is a curious paradox that where two or three are 
gathered together in one place they will with one accord pretend an 
admiration for him; and when they are gathered together in the 
formidable surroundings of a British jury, they are easily persuaded 
that they themselves are, each and generally, reasonable men." 
(Uncommon Law, 4). 
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Should we torture people? 
 
      The absence of the use of torture in criminal trials throughout 
most of English history is a notable feature of its legal system. 
Very early on the English courts set their face against torture. 
People believed that if you tortured someone you would not get a 
true confession. The tortured person would lie in order to make 
the torture stop. There was also perhaps a certain appreciation of 
the force in the philosopher Montaigne’s remark that ‘After all, it 
is setting a very high price on one’s conjectures to burn a man 
alive for them.’ 
 
        In English law you did not need the confession of the 
accused, whereas in what are known as ‘Inquisitorial’ systems, 
you do.  You proved them guilty or not on the basis of evidence.  
It has never mattered what the individual thinks after he has been 
proven guilty. If the jury thinks that you are guilty, you are guilty. 
You can go to prison or the gallows tree protesting you 
innocence. That is your right.  
 
         This tradition of avoiding the short-cut of torture is also, as 
you know, under threat. Some of those engaged in the ‘war 
against terrorism’ in Britain and America, where torture is 
currently banned, are now arguing that it should be allowed, or at 
least the evidence from those tortured by less scrupulous regimes 
in other countries should be accepted. I shall return to this in the 
last lecture on the relations between the citizen and the state.  
 
How unusual is England? 
 
       As most famously encapsulated in the theories of John Locke, 
the essence of English law is the protection of the individual and 
his or her rights: to a certain amount of liberty, freedom of 
speech, control of his or her body and personal space and to 
everything that they own. Ownership includes visible things, like 
bits of land and houses, but also invisible things, such as 
intellectual property rights and certain things such as the right to a 
title or office.  
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      In most societies, law is mainly concerned with interpersonal 
matters of status and physical injuries. England, in contrast, has 
been obsessed with property, with civil law, that is cases between 
individuals who use the courts to sort out disputes about who has 
rights in what.  
 
     Nowadays the principles of an old English system have spread 
through the former British Empire and the United States. They are 
so widespread that they have become the normal way of 
proceeding. Many of the fundamental ideas, for instance the 
absence of judicial torture, the separation of politics from law and 
the rules of evidence have become enshrined in the European 
constitution and elsewhere. This makes it easy to forget that if we 
had looked around the world in about 1750 we would have been 
astonished at the English exception.  
 
Does the English system have advantages? 
 
       The sophisticated development of property law and 
safeguarding of economic interests have helped to make England 
and America wealthy. People can afford to trust each other and if 
that trust breaks down they can use the legal system. The early 
development of industrial capitalism could not have occurred 
without the extraordinary development of English law.  
 
       The other main advantage of this kind of legal system is that, 
on the whole, the majority of people feel safe under it. Without a 
legal warrant from a Justice of the Peace, the police cannot raid a 
person’s house or business. Most people most of the time can rest 
secure that they will not be subject to arbitrary punishment or 
imprisonment, except asylum seekers and some racial minorities.   
 
      If you are thrown into prison you have the right to call a 
lawyer and the right to know what you are being charged with, 
and the right to be freed if no charge is brought within a certain 
number of hours (habeas corpus).  
 
      Under the rule of law, an individual is relatively free from 
censorship of thought and action. Criticism of the authorities, 
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freedom of speech (within reason), the possibilities of reasoned 
opposition to the present system, are all tolerated.  
 
       Some of these advantages of the rule of law are being 
whittled away. State officials argue that suspected terrorists and 
asylum seekers should not be given legal protection, they should 
be imprisoned without charge or trial for long periods. There are 
those who now fear that once certain categories of people are 
denied basic legal protection, it will not be too long before we all 
find ourselves in the nightmare world of Stalin or Chairman Mao.  
 
Are there disadvantages? 
 
       People complain about the slowness, cost, complexity and at 
times inefficiency of the English system. There is something in 
the satirist Jonathan Swift’s observation that ‘Laws are like 
cobwebs, which may catch small flies, but let wasps and hornets 
break through.’  It is sometimes impossible to convict someone 
who is clearly guilty. The inquisitorial system, where the judge 
can call for more investigation, might well avoid some of these 
difficulties.   
 
       Yet the main disadvantage of the English system is that it can 
generate an antagonistic attitude. Much of the English system of 
politics and social life (including sports) is confrontational. The 
English legal system is odd because it believes, or pretends to 
believe, that disputes are resolvable into one person winning 
(being right) and the other losing (being wrong). If this is 
accepted, then the best way to sort out difficulties is to get those 
in the dispute to carry out as fierce an argument as possible in 
front of a referee.  
 
      In divorces for instance, a confrontational legal system can 
lead to much bitterness. The people who profit most from this are 
the lawyers, who sometimes have a vested interest in dragging the 
case out.  There is much in life where right is evenly divided and 
mediation or arbitration, poorly developed in the English legal 
system, is a much better approach to settlement. 
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        In a Nepalese village all quarrels are settled outside the court 
and in Japan nearly everything is done through mediation or 
arbitration.  The aim of the Anglo-American system is to cut ties, 
to have a winner and a loser. The aim of many dispute settlement 
systems has been reconciliation. Relationships are complex and 
multi-stranded. People will have to on living close to each other 
and inter-acting in various ways.   It is best that their quarrel is 
smoothed over, rather than settled dramatically in favour of one or 
the other.  
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4 .   Enemies and fr iends of the state 
 
Bandits and the reasons for bandits; mafia type organizations and 
their functions; heresy and terrorism, the threats of ‘evil’; civil 
society – corporations, associations and the origins of freedom. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://downloads.sms.cam.ac.uk/1411683/1411688.m4v 
 
Reading 
Hann, Social Anthropology, ch.12 
Erik Hobsbawm, Bandits (1972) 
Anton Blok, The Mafia of a Sicilian Village, 1860-1960 (1974) 
Norman Cohn, Europe’s Inner Demons (1975) 
Charles Townsend, Terrorism: A Very Short Introduction (2002) 
Chris Hann & Elizabeth Dunn (eds.), Civil Society (1996) 
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NOTES ON WHICH THE LECTURE WAS BASED 
 
We can imagine the threats to the state as a set of concentric 
rings. In the midst is the State itself, in the outer ring is war; 
feuding; bandits; mafia; terrorists/heretics; corporate groups (I 
shall leave out criminals for the moment).  
 
I have dealt with war and feuding separately. Here are bandits, 
mafia, terrorists and/or heretics, corporate groups and civil 
society.  
 
Bandits       
      
What is a bandit? 
 
‘An Italian word, used of foreign countries in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. Literally a proscribed outlawed person, 
particularly associated with mountain districts of Italy, Sicily, 
Spain, Greece and Turkey.’ (OED) 
 
Some theories (D. Roccapino, Brigands and Bandits (n.d. c.1890) 
 
Why so many bandits in Italy? 
 
a. historical/political – after fall of Rome, Italy broken into 
small stages, occupied by foreign powers, quarrelling – 
gives borders for outlaws to flee across [hence Scottish 
borders, N & S.Ireland, much of Africa now] 
 
b. geographical – mountains, ravines, forests, caverns afford 
excellent haunts for protection and concealment – fine 
temperature etc. makes it possible for them to subsist 
[hence mountains, forest, marshes] 
 
c. attitude towards state and law: thinks Latin, Greek and 
Celtic peoples instinctively question the equity of laws 
and question those in authority; while Scandinavians and 
Teutonic, instinctively conservative and law-abiding 
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[something in this, further north in Europe, the less 
bandits… why?] 
 
Schneiders, Western Sicily 
 
d. the importance of animal rustling, extraordinarily lucrative 
etc. combined with weak police force  [cf. narcotics, 
Colombia, Golden Triangle etc] 
 
Hobsbawm, Bandits 
 
Defines bandits as ‘a form of individual or minority rebellion 
within peasant societies’, Robin Hood type, not stealing from 
neighbours etc.  
 
Amazing uniform and found in ‘China, Peru, Sicily, the Ukraine 
or Indonesia’ also throughout Americas, Europe, the Islamic 
world, South and East Asia.  
 
e. banditry at its worst in times of political or economic 
dislocation (e.g. Thirty Years War in Europe, or bad times 
(e.g. 1920’s) in China.  
f. While endemic in peasantries, becomes epidemic during 
the transition from peasantry to capitalism; bandits and 
peasants linked 
g. Weak political integration of the State, so the peasant 
community largely autonomous and State unable to police 
h. Geographically on the margins – in forests, fens, 
mountains, the ‘water margin’ 
i. Because of pastoral economy, young men unemployed – 
people have to leave either to fight in foreign armies (e.g. 
Scots, Swiss, Gurkhas) or as part time bandits predating 
on the settled inhabitants.  
j.  
Criticisms of these theories: Anton Blok and Barrington Moore 
 
B-Moore (p.213-4): in China – local peasants the objects of 
gangsterism. ‘the use of violence to prey on the population 
indiscriminately without the slightest interest in altering the 
political system… it is necessary to beware of romanticizing the 
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robber as a friend of the poor, just as much as of accepting the 
official image. Characteristically the local inhabitants would 
bargain with the bandits in order to be left in peace. Quite often 
local gentry leaders were on cordial terms with bandits.’ 
 
Blok on Sicilian Mafia:  
p.497 ‘I shall argue that the element of class conflict as embodied 
in certain forms of banditry has received undue emphasis. Rather 
than actual champions of the poor and the weak, bandits quite 
often terrorized those from whose very ranks they managed to 
rise, and thus helped to suppress them…we know that bandits 
have fulfilled pivotal roles in the demobilization of peasants’  
 
Reasons for Hobsbawm’s error: 
a. an over narrow definition of social banditry – lots of kinds 
b. little consideration of relations to wider society, bandits 
relations to local power holders; often used by local 
powerful 
 
Three examples of the difficulty from my experience 
 
The above models would allow us to predict that bandits will be 
found: 
Where – mountains/ravines/marshes etc.      
Where – political boundaries 
Where - pastoralism  
When – in stage between tribal/capitalist – ie. peasants 
When – times of political or economic dislocation (epidemics, 
famines)  
When – when central governments is weak and unable to 
maintain law 
When – in transition from feudal/peasant to capitalist 
 
Upland Nepal in last 100 years fulfils many of these, but not 
banditry (Buddhism, opportunities in British army, tradition of 
self enforcement) – but now Maoism, but still no bandits 
 
South-western China: parts are pastoral, borders etc. But 
politically unified since Mao and no bandits. Likewise no bandits 
 74 
in Japanese history, though the absence of borders was important 
there.  
 
Northern England in C17-18: remote, pastoral, upland, 1688 etc. 
but no bandits (see Justice and the Mare’s Ale).  
 
As with much of social theory, we can perhaps specify some 
necessary conditions – but certainly not sufficient ones.  
 
 
 MAFIA AND SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONS       
 
Some characteristics of mafia-type organizations 
 
Various etymologies discussed in Gambetta: may mean the 
‘rejected’, or ‘place of refuge’ (Arabic) 
 
stands for a morality based on revenge, blood for blood, stress on 
silence, vengeance after a delay, omerta (manliness) 
 
According to N. Lewis (p.33) it was ‘the product of weak 
government that had developed its own vested interest in 
governmental weakness… the targets of popular fury were always 
the same: the landlord, the Church, the police…’ 
 
Yet it also becomes an agent of the state and of the Church, 
controlling crime and ensuring order (Lewis) 
 
The ethnography of violence 
 
Well described by Anton Blok: ‘ the recourse to violence 
prevalent in this part of Sicily and expressed in theft, extortion, 
ransom, arson, shooting, and homicide was taken for granted and 
accepted rather than questioned.’ (p.174) 
 
Every gesture, every organization, every activity was saturated by 
violence; even everyday language reflects ‘the part played by 
unlicensed violence in Sicilian peasant society’ (p.211) 
 
 75 
For example, the village of Genuardo, with a population of 2000 
to 2500, from 1916-1966 had no less than 93 homicides reported 
– others probably unreported.  
 
Theory 1: Anton Blok and the political interpretation 
 
We see in Sicily the side effects of the dissolution of a 
feudal/peasant society under the impact of a market economy and 
a centralized nation-state. The State formation which had 
occurred in other parts of Europe in the sixteenth century was 
replacing ‘churches, clans, empires, cities, federations’ etc. by the 
nation-state which only occurred in Sicily during the C19 and 
C20 
 
The mafia act as brokers, as middlemen, tolerated by the law and 
landlords as informal agents of order in this in-between situation. 
They inhabit the interstices between landlord and peasant, city 
and country, the ‘Great’ and ‘Little’ traditions. They grow and 
decline in relation to the central power; there is an ‘inverse 
relation between the extent and acceptance of private violence and 
the level of State control over the means of coercion’ (xxviii).  
 
The weakness of the State throughout most of the last 150 years, 
combined with the great poverty, physical hardships caused by 
climate, disease and terrain and the social atomism of a cognatic 
kinship system, have combined to produce a situation where 
informal violence has flourished.  
 
Theory 2: Gambetta and the economic interpretation 
 
Central thesis: ‘the mafia is a specific economic enterprise, an 
industry which produces, promotes and sells private protection’ 
(p.1) 
 
The mafia creates a need for itself by destroying trust, and then 
supplying it. It deals in the same commodity as the State, i.e. 
security 
 
It deals particularly in those areas where the State cannot 
intervene; ‘every time the state decrees a particular transaction or 
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commodity illegal, a potential market for private protection is 
created’. (p.3) 
 
The core of the thesis: ‘When the butcher comes to me to buy an 
animal, he knows that I want to cheat him. But I know that he 
wants to cheat me. Thus we need, say Peppe (that is, a third party) 
to make us agree. And we both pay Peppe a percentage of the 
deal.’ (p.15) 
 
‘My claim is that the making market for mafia services is to be 
found in unstable transactions in which trust is scarce and fragile’.  
 
This is analogous to taxes or insurance premiums.  
 
The mafia are best seen not as ‘violent entrepreneurs’, but as 
‘entrepreneurs of violence’ (p.77) Their presence ‘can be 
understood as a response to the lack of trust specifically affecting 
southern Italy’. What they offer is the reputation that they can 
enforce contracts; they are ‘men of honour’, those who step out of 
line will suffer, hence their trademarks such as dark glasses, or a 
prickly pear leaf placed beside on of their victims.  
 
Theory 3: Arlachi and types of social structure 
 
A study of three small regions in the toe of Italy, Calabria 
 
In Cosentino, there was a traditional small-holding peasantry with 
a DMP (minifundia). There was no mafia.  
 
In Crotonese, there were large capitalist estates with wage 
labourers (latifundia) and much poverty. No mafia. 
 
In the plain of Gioia, in between – unstable, medium-sized 
agricultural holdings, yet a fully working market economy had 
not emerged. There was ‘a war of all against all, families against 
families, groups against groups’ (p.89) The ‘social structure was 
characterized precisely by the absence of this transfer of powers 
to civil society and central authority’. (p.104) 
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Hence mafia was widespread: ‘Mafiosi became the civil and 
criminal judges, mediators, protectors, arbitrators, subsuming in 
themselves many delicate functions normally exercised by the 
power of the State.’ (p.114)  
 
He concludes ‘The mafia phenomenon on was born out of a 
situation of anomic competition for honour, and represented an 
excellent instrument of social ascent in a system of commercial 
capitalism…’ 
 
Conclusion 
 
Mafia-type organizations are now very widespread in the world; 
they are found in all large civilizations. Among the most famous 
are the triads (China), the yakuza (Japan), and criminal 
organizations in the former Soviet Union and in India.  
 
The yakuza are somewhat different, however, since they are a 
semi-legal organization, who have recruiting offices, public 
meetings where the police provide parking, physical symbols 
which are easy to identify (tattoos, missing fingers, dark glasses 
and stretch limousines), and indeed they need these. It is no good 
if people do not know they are yakuza. They are the overlords of 
that world of prostitution, gambling, drinking and so on which the 
State can neither police (corruption) nor leave unpoliced (too 
lucrative).  
 
Terrorism and Heresy 
 
       Those in power usually feel under threat. At one time it was 
the Jews who were rumoured to form an international conspiracy 
to undermine Christian values. They were believed to eat 
Christian children, engage in obscene rituals and generally to be 
subversive of all good values. In the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries certain beliefs coming in from Asia were declared to be 
heretical and the Cathars or Albigensians in the south of France 
were destroyed by sword and fire in a giant and ferocious crusade 
led by the Pope.  
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      Then in the fifteenth century an even greater menace was 
thought to have arisen. Satan or the Devil emerged to lead a secret 
assault on civilization with his army of witches. For two hundred 
years the international conspiracy of evil was thought to consist of 
witches. Since they were such a threat and could not be detected 
by normal means, special measures were needed. Manuals were 
written, legal codes were bent and amended to deal with the new 
threat. The previous tools to crush heresy, including the Holy 
Office of the Inquisition, were now used in the war against 
supposed witches. Thousands were rounded up, tried, convicted 
and burnt.  
 
       So extreme was the fear that even in countries without the 
Catholic Inquisition and with a different legal system, the laws 
were altered to deal with the new threat. In England in the 
sixteenth century, people who could not normally act as 
witnesses, children against their parents, a husband against his 
wife, were permitted to do so in these special circumstances. 
Previous evidence of behaviour, attitudes and crimes, not 
normally revealed, could be brought before the court. The 
individual could be placed under unusual physical and mental 
pressures in order to find evidence. He or she could be deprived 
of sleep for long periods, supposedly to see if her ‘familiars’ (a 
small diabolical pet) came to visit her, but, in effect, breaking 
down her resistance. The presumption of innocence was greatly 
diminished, the necessity for direct proof was waived and 
circumstantial or ‘spectral’ (hazy spiritual) evidence was allowed.  
 
      In the end, faced with universal fear and loathing, shunned by 
their friends, told that they were part of a grand conspiracy of 
Satanic covens or cells loosely joined to each other, the poor 
creatures confessed and implicated others. They then confirmed 
that an organization existed whose totally irrational, unjustified 
and unprovoked aim was to undermine ‘civilization’ as we know 
it. So ‘civilization’ responded by further abandoning the very 
justification for its existence. Using the special techniques now 
allowed, it ‘proved’ the existence of witches and hanged or burnt 
thousands of them. Only much later did doubt set in. It emerged 
that the whole conspiracy was a delusion created by the legal 
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methods used to attack it. Thousands had been destroyed on the 
basis of an illusion.  
 
       Similar panics still occur. In the 1950’s it was a panic about a 
secret conspiracy of ‘communists’ which led to the McCarthy 
trials in America and the destruction of the reputation of many 
innocent people.  
 
       Then in the 1980’s in Britain a new threat came to light, the 
so-called paedophile rings. The details of their activities and the 
widespread sexual abuse of children by their parents were often 
‘recalled’ when children were ‘counselled’ by sympathetic 
experts. Satanic rituals in which children were sexually abused 
and even human sacrifices were supposed to occur, were suddenly 
believed to be widespread. Hundreds were imprisoned, thousands 
of children were taken away from their parents in dawn raids. 
Only later, as the panic declined, was it discovered that most of 
the accusations were false, created by the very methods of trying 
to deal with them.  
 
      So there are plenty of precedents for the fear of a malevolent 
Other, and all of them tend to involve the shadowy presence of 
Evil, the Devil or Satan. Worldwide conspiracies against 
civilization were thought to have existed for thousands of years.  
Among them were Christianity and Islam themselves before they 
came to dominate.  
 
What is the ‘Axis of Evil’? 
 
       The recent rise in the fear of what a President of the United 
States called the ‘Axis of Evil’ is a general umbrella term. Like an 
earlier President’s remark about ‘the Empire of Evil’, referring to 
the Soviet Union, it has wider implications once it circulates 
through the media.  
 
      The evil is envisaged as a threat to all civilized values. It is 
believed to threaten the State and all aspects of a society, just as 
witches or Jews or heretics were thought to menace the 
foundations of Christian morality in the past.  Some think the 
threat is sufficiently serious to justify the dismantling of the 
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protections for ‘terrorists’. A vast conspiracy is feared and this 
tends to be fuelled by the moral panic that is whipped up. This 
movement appeals to those whose power and prestige is 
enhanced. They may, as with the great witch-hunters of the past, 
feel a glow of satisfaction and passionately believe that they are 
protecting their God and their country. 
 
      Looking back after the event, as we can now do with witch 
hunting, we may well come to feel the same about the current 
panic. People may conclude that the action of the State in 
countering terrorism is undermining the very values it claims to 
protect.  
 
       Beliefs in Satan, witches and the Axis of Evil are a perpetual, 
irrefutable, justification for sweeping counter measures. We are 
used to the temporary and drastic suspension of normal legal 
protections and processes during a limited war. In the Second 
World War, for example, suspected aliens were rounded up and 
imprisoned without trial, all citizens immediately lost many of 
their rights, freedom of speech was severely curtailed, loyalty to 
the State became paramount.  Serious criticism was discouraged 
as being close to treason. If you are not fully for us, it was argued, 
you must be against us.  The State was justified in bullying, lying, 
deceiving, swooping down, spying on anyone. Truth is said to be 
the first casualty of war; the freedom and rights of individuals are 
the second.  
 
     Afterwards there may be apologies, as there were, for example, 
to the large numbers of innocent Japanese rounded up and locked 
away in America after Pearl Harbour. But that is afterwards. War 
itself usually spells an end to liberty and equality before the law.  
 
      Yet wars, at least the typical wars of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, had one compensation. They tended to be 
bounded. There was a period of war and civil liberties and the 
normal processes of law were suspended. But then there was 
peace and the luxury of freedom could again be afforded by the 
State and was demanded by a citizenry who had not forgotten its 
earlier freedoms. People even persuaded themselves that this is 
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what they had been fighting for, even if they had had to abandon 
the rights and freedoms temporarily.  
 
       The ‘Axis of Evil’, whether al-Qua’ida, or the satanic cults of 
witches, is rather different. This is a world linked to certain 
tendencies within Christianity and Islam. Those involved on both 
sides of the struggle believe that there is someone out there who is 
trying to undermine their way of life and whose motives they 
cannot fathom. These unseen folk are Evil, whether they are the 
feared western capitalists or Islamic fundamentalists. They are 
believed by many to be in league with the Devil.  
 
      The defenders of ‘our’ way of life believe that Evil never 
sleeps, is always plotting, always invisible, irrationally consumed 
with a desire to destroy ‘our’ rational, sane, orderly, pleasant way 
of life. It lurks menacingly, ‘reds under the beds’ as the 
communists were once described, or, to use a more modern 
metaphor, the ‘monster’ hiding in the wardrobe of the frightened 
child in ‘Monsters Inc’.  
 
     Just as in the past witches were thought to hide behind the 
outward smiles of neighbours, terrorists are believed by some to 
conceal themselves as ‘students’ in our universities. Evil will use 
any weapons, of single or ‘mass’ destruction, curses, the 
poisoning of wells (a well known technique ascribed to witches 
and Jews in the past), and pestilences (biological warfare against 
animals and humans) and plagues of caterpillars or locusts.  
 
        There may be temporary victories, but there can be no truce 
or termination. We must fight continuously, for evil is hydra-
headed. Cut off one of its manifestations, for instance the Taliban 
in Afghanistan, and it will spring up again elsewhere. Worst of 
all, it is not just an external threat, as are the conventional 
enemies, the Germans, the French, the British or whoever we 
were fighting against in the wars between nation-states. The 
minions of the Evil One are in our midst, or so it is alleged.  
 
      We are told that terrorism feeds on envy, in the envy of poor 
immigrants for their hosts, of impoverished Third World people 
who cannot accept that the fact that they earn one hundredth of 
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what a westerner in many affluent societies earns is perfectly fair. 
The poison lurks in the devious practices of people who eat 
strange foods (not, as was supposed with Jews and witches in the 
past, babies and other sacrificial victims, but highly spiced and 
strange substances, or rubbishy fast food), who go through strange 
rituals (not satanic ones, but worshipping Allah or other Gods), 
who wear too few clothes (mini) or too many (veils).   
 
     Of course there are differences between earlier panics and the 
present one. Witches, we know, could not actually harm people. 
A bomb, delivered by whichever side in the battle, kills and 
maims. The main point, however, is to realize from past 
experience that it is very easy to get into an almost unending 
vicious circle of fear. We would do well to remember a line from 
Edwin Muir’s poem. ‘We have seen Good men made evil 
wrangling with the evil, Straight minds grown crooked fighting 
crooked minds.’   
 
Civil society and its enemies 
 
     ‘Civil society’ usually refers to the world of associations and 
organizations which lie between the State and the individual. In 
many societies it is the family group and sometimes the religious 
caste which inhabits this space. Yet in the modern west these are 
less important. 
 
       Instead there is a multitude of organizations to which people 
belong, but which are not run by the State. Schools, universities, 
trades unions, political clubs, sporting clubs, religious groups, 
scientific and literary clubs, economic institutions, these and 
many others enable someone to belong to an organization. This 
can provide strength through numbers and the pooling of 
resources. 
 
     In most civilizations in the past, and in Fascist and Communist 
nations in the last century, all these institutions were banned, or 
controlled by the State. Individuals owed their allegiance to the 
State or Party, not to other organizations. Civil Society was 
prohibited. How is it, then, that these associations and groups now 
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flourish in such a lively way in much of the world? And what 
effect does this have? 
 
Where did an open society come from? 
 
      The revival of Roman law, which spread over all of 
continental Europe between the fourteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, brought with it a homogenizing, flattening, tendency. 
This set almost all of Europe along a new path. Yet during this 
important period England retained its Common (Germanic) Law 
system.  
 
       At this time, a legal accident occurred in England that was to 
change the world we live in.  Lawyers were, as ever, trying to find 
a way round a tax regime. When a wealthy man died, his landed 
property, held in the strict feudal system directly of the King, was 
forfeited back to the Crown. In order for his heirs to re-claim it, 
they had to pay a heavy death duty on their estates. Naturally the 
rich did not like this. Their legal advisors saw that the problem 
could be avoided if they made the man at his death no longer the 
owner of the property. If he did not hold the property at death, the 
Crown could not seize it and insist on a tax before it passed on to 
his heirs.   
 
       So the lawyers invented the device of the Trust. A group of 
friends of the property holder were chosen and the estate was 
legally conveyed to them. They held it ‘in trust for the use of 
another’. It was legally theirs to do what they liked with, but the 
owner trusted them to pass it on at his death to his heirs and to 
carry out his wishes in whatever way he had privately told them.  
 
      The Trust created a strange and anomalous thing. Trustees 
were appointed to work together to hold and administer property 
and to take collective decisions. The Trust had a name, a separate 
existence, a body that existed through time. So it was technically 
a ‘corporation’, a ‘body’. Yet it had not been set up by the State, it 
had not been ‘incorporated’ or licensed by the State with a formal 
document. It had been set up by a group of private citizens, yet it 
was recognized by national law.  
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       Such entities were threatening to the State if they became 
powerful since trustees could make their own rules. It also 
allowed citizens to work together and create alternative loyalties. 
Consequently Mussolini and Hitler banned during the French, 
Russian and Chinese revolutionary periods, and trusts. In 
England, Henry VIII tried to destroy them but it was too late. 
Abolished for a few years, the Trusts were restored by a technical 
legal trick. 
 
How did we get freedom? 
 
         From very early on the Trust idea spread beyond the simple 
avoiding of death duties. The idea provided a device which could 
be used for any need. In the field of economics, any group that 
wished to set up a mutually-supportive, private, non-State, entity 
could now do so. Whether it was a great trading organization such 
as the East India Company, a bank or insurance company such as 
Lloyds, or even the Stock Exchange, the device of the Trust was 
ready at hand. Much of the success of Britain came from this form 
of organization. The United States has widely used the same idea 
as the foundation of the mighty trusts and corporations which now 
rule the world.   
 
         In religion, the Trust sheltered the growing independence of 
the Protestant Christian sects. Without the ability to set up 
meeting places and independent organizations provided by the 
Trust, the Quakers, Baptists, Methodists and other religious 
nonconformists could never have flourished. Much of what we 
call religious liberty was made possible by this device. Without it, 
in certain Catholic countries, the Jews, Masons, Lutherans and 
others were persecuted almost to extinction.  
 
      When the State becomes more powerful it does not usually 
tolerate rivals. The growth of parties, of political clubs and 
organizations, grew out of the Trust concept. The early clubs of 
the Whigs and Tories, the later clubs and associations of working 
men, the Trades Union movement, all were based on the legal 
device of the Trust.  
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       Likewise, the whole system of devolved government, the 
shires with their magistrates and local power, the parish councils 
and many other local and regional bodies were given strength by 
the concept. Local educational and church organizations, 
grammar schools and vestries, all were trust-based.  
 
       Normally rulers come to believe that power is their private 
property, they own it. The strange thing in Democracy is that 
power is held in trust for the people. The present rulers are 
trustees, they have been entrusted with temporary power, which is 
not theirs but has to be passed on to their successors. When they 
are felt no longer to be performing adequately, they are replaced 
by another ‘board of trustees’, or as they are called, the 
Government. The corruption of power is held in check by the 
limited period for which it can be held.   
 
How did we get social and intellectual freedom? 
 
       The Trust gave the British two of their most famous 
institutions. There were the social and philanthropic clubs and 
associations; the Women’s Institute, the Boy Scouts and the Girl 
Guides, Oxfam, Amnesty, the Samaritans, the Salvation Army, 
the National Trust, the Royal Societies for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals, for the Protection of Birds, for the Protection 
of Children, the Lions, the Rotarians. There were numerous 
working class clubs and organizations, funeral societies, pigeon-
fancying, leek growing, discussion groups, sports groups. Many 
of the clubs and institutions which have spread around the world 
were invented in Britain on the basis of the idea of non-
governmental clubs.  
 
     The Universities and learned societies, whether of the elite (the 
Royal Society, British Academy) or the masses (working men’s 
clubs, local libraries and institutions such as the London Lending 
Library) were based on the trust idea. Without these, the meetings 
of engineers, philosophers and others in the coffee clubs and 
hundreds of small groupings would not have occurred. These 
clubs had an incalculable effect on the development of scientific 
and industrial knowledge.  
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What happens if we don’t trust people? 
 
          The Trust idea encouraged that rare commodity ‘trust’ to 
develop. Without this, the economic, political and social 
foundations of modern Democracies could not exist. The hybrid 
device of the Trust runs counter to most of the powerful 
tendencies in the development of civilizations. Almost always any 
advance in wealth or power in a society has, after a short while, 
been gobbled up by the central power. Knowledge is power, so it 
must be incorporated into the centre. Social status is power, so it 
must be harnessed. Economic wealth must be absorbed. Religious 
loyalty must be channelled towards the State in alliance with the 
clergy. The State demands all of this. If the State is threatened, or 
pretends to be threatened, its demands are almost impossible to 
reject.  
 
        Other threatening institutions are systematically extinguished 
or enfeebled, until in the later periods of every Empire, whether in 
Rome, China, the Habsburgs, the Ottomans or France, the 
peripheral powers are weak. There develops a central power 
which aspires to be all-powerful and which is supported by an 
ever-growing bureaucracy and standing army. When the 
absolutisms of the twentieth century emerged, with their superior 
forms of surveillance and advanced technologies of control, even 
the family group was shattered. Nothing stands between the 
individual and Joseph Stalin, Chairman Mao or Pol Pot. 
 
       The State is like a machine for cutting grass, a lawn-mower 
with its blade fixed at the maximum setting so it is very close to 
the earth. It cuts off and absorbs into itself anything that sticks up 
more than a tiny way. If the universities, the monasteries, the 
cities, the traders and merchants, the industrial producers or 
anyone else starts to accumulate visible wealth and power, 
especially if they start to proclaim their own rules and 
independent government, the State officials savagely prune or 
eliminate them. Only two types of organization can survive such a 
system which confiscates any conspicuous wealth and destroys all 
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alternative power structures, secret organizations (like mafia, 
Masons etc.) and the family.  
 
How are trust and democracy linked? 
 
        Through an accident, Civil Society, that is the thick layer of 
organizations which lies between the State and the individual 
Subject or Citizen, continued and flourished and the civil liberties 
and rights of free thought and free association became 
increasingly valued.  
 
      Such a flourishing of Civil Society and alternative centres of 
power has, of course, happened before in history, as in Athens in 
its great period, or for a time in the Italian city states. Yet in most 
cases the experiment had been small and short-lived. Only when 
the trust coincided with two other developments (which it also 
helped to bring into being) could a new type of civilization be 
established. 
 
      One of these was a new way of obtaining reliable knowledge 
about the natural world (the scientific revolution). The other was a 
new way of harnessing that knowledge to generate new power 
and wealth for humans (the industrial revolution). When these 
two were joined with the Trust, there developed a powerful form 
of political and social system, which we often term ‘the open 
society’.  
 
       Yet it is well to remember that the creation of an open society 
was an accident, an unintended consequence of many other 
forces. It was not the result of superior virtues or intelligence on 
the part of people living in one part of the world. We should also 
remember that it is constantly under pressure from forces from 
both the left and right.  
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SOME DEFINITIONS AND TECHNICAL TERMS  
 
(Compiled by Alan Macfarlane: for private use of students. If you 
would like a full version covering all of anthropology, please see  
www.alanmacfarlane.com under ‘Lectures’. The full 
definitions can be printed out. The sources for these definitions in 
various textbooks is given there.) 
 
Acephalous society : Literally a “headless” society. Refers to a highly 
decentralized and relatively egalitarian form of political organizations. 
Associat ion: a social group based on shared interest or voluntary 
participation.  
Band: Basic social unit in many foraging populations. Normally 
includes one hundred or fewer - all related by kinship or marriage. 
Big Man: Figure often found among tribal horticulturalists and 
pastoralists. The big man occupies no office but creates his own 
reputation through entrepreneurial expertise and generosity to others. 
Neither his wealth nor his position passes to his heirs.  
Bureaucracy:  the specialized administrative organization concerned 
with the day-to-day running of the state.  
Cargo cults : revitalization movements that attempt to gain European 
goods (cargo) by magical imitation of European behaviour and 
technology; typical of Melanesia.  
Charisma, charismatic: a quality, coming from a person rather than 
from an office, that inspires intense loyalty and devotion; often has 
religious significance, linking prophet and followers.  
Chiefdom: (1) Form of socio-political organization based on food 
production, usually agriculture or intensive horticulture, in which kinship 
remains important and generosity is associated with political office. Often 
a transitional form between tribal society and state. (2) a political system 
in which kin groups are linked together through a hierarchy of political 
and/or religious leadership.  
Civi l  society : there are several meanings. One, derived from eighteenth 
century Enlightenment thought, refers to all associations and activities 
which lie between the State and its organs on the one hand, and the 
individual or citizen on the other (e.g. colleges, clubs, sects, firms etc. 
etc.)  
Contract/Status:  as used by lawyers (esp. Maine), the difference 
between relations based on choice, some kind of agreement, and those 
based on birth or non-choice. The movement to modern societies often 
thought to be the movement from status to contract based systems.  
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Corporate Group: (1)A social group whose members act as a legal 
individual in terms of collective rights to property, a common group 
name, collective responsibility, etc. (2) Groups that exist in perpetuity and 
manage a common estate. Includes some descent groups and modern 
industrial corporations.  
Ethnic boundary markers : any overt characteristics that can be used 
to indicate ethnic group membership.  
Ethnic group: (1) People whose particular customs and cultural 
heritage differ from other such groups and from the main body of society 
(2) a named social group based on perceptions of shared ancestry, 
cultural traditions, and common history that culturally distinguish that 
group from other groups.  
Feud, feuding:  (1) Continuing hostility, enmity, and recurrent 
aggression between social groups. (2) violent extralegal conflicts that 
occur between subgroups of the same society.  
Feudal ism: a social and economic system whereby land is held, by 
conferred right, by members of a privileged class, who can command the 
labour of a lower class that works the land.  
Hydraulic  society : an advanced agricultural society making use of 
irrigation and tending to have a high degree of political centralization.  
Ideology: (1)A cultural belief system, particularly one that entails 
systematic distortion or masking of the true nature of social, political, and 
economic relation. (2) values and beliefs about how the world is or 
should be ordered that are consciously and systematically organized into 
some form of program.  
Law: a body of social norms in a society, which its members must abide 
by and which may be enforced by an agency recognized as having 
political authority in that society.  
Mil lenarian movement: a social movement espousing a belief in the 
coming of a new world (a millenium), in part through supernatural action. 
Nation-state: socio-political system with a government and sharp 
contrasts in wealth, prestige and power.  
National i ty : an ethnic group which claims a right to a discrete 
homeland and to political autonomy and self-determination.  
Neo-colonial ism: The process whereby industrial nations control the 
political and economic life of nominally independent countries through 
investment and support of local elites. 
Race: a category based upon physical traits.  
Racism: the explanation of a people’s behaviour in terms of genetic 
endowment, usually associated with a belief in the innate superiority and 
inferiority of particular groups.  
Rank society: a society having no socially structured unequal access to 
economic resources, but having socially structured unequal access to 
status positions and prestige. 
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Revolut ion: a fundamental change in the rules governing social, 
political and other relations, an overturning (as changing cricket to 
football), as opposed to ‘rebellion’, which is just changing the players.  
Secret  societ ies : groups that restrict their membership and maintain 
secrecy about their rituals, group practices, and special esoteric 
knowledge.  
Segmentary: Of descent systems, defining descent categories with 
reference to more remote apical ancestors so that the descent categories 
form a treelike structure (including successively wider ranges of 
descendants). 
State: (1) A political entity that exercises sovereign rights over a territory 
and exercises power through centralized, hierarchical political institutions 
of control, revenue extraction, and enforcement of law and civic duty. (2) 
A political unit with centralized decision-making affecting a large 
population. Most states have cities with public buildings; full-time craft 
and religious specialists; and “official” art style; a hierarchical social 
structure topped by an elite class; and a governmental monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force to implement policies. 
Succession: Assumption of an office that has been vacated; the pattern 
whereby successors are chosen. 
Tribe: (1) Form of socio-political organization generally based on 
horticulture or pastoralism, more rarely on foraging or agriculture. Socio-
economic stratification and centralized rule are absent in tribes, and there 
is no means of enforcing political decisions. (2) A small-scale society 
characterized by a distinctive language and culture with a political identity 
but not central, hierarchical institutions.  
Voluntary associat ions: organizations like burial societies, social 
clubs, and trade associations that people join.  
Warfare: Formalized armed combat by groups representing rival 
political communities.  
World system: A social system encompassing the entire world and 
entailing a single division of labour.  
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FILMS ON LOCATION ABOUT WAR AND 
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